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Abstract
ESSAYS ON NON-GAAP EARNINGS DISCLOSURE
by
Hangsoo Kyung
Advisers: Professors Joseph Weintrop and Carol Marquradt
Essay1: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new Compliance and
Disclosure Interpretations (CDI) in 2010, relaxing enforcement of Regulation G and Regulation
S-K. The nonbinding nature and opaque procedures behind interpretive guidance cast doubt as to
whether SEC staff interpretations changed a firm’s voluntary disclosure. In this paper, I find that
firms more frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings after the issuance of new CDI, suggesting
that nonbinding SEC staff interpretations influence corporate disclosure practice. Compared to
the pre-CDI period, non-GAAP exclusions are of higher quality in the post-CDI period. The
exclusion quality of firms who started to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period is
of higher than that of firm who frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings in both the pre- and postCDI periods. These results suggest that relaxed interpretive guidance of non-GAAP regulations
reduced the cost of non-opportunistic disclosure, resulting in more frequent and higher quality
non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-CDI period. In addition, I find that such a relation
exists among firms with high corporate board independence. Consistent with higher non-GAAP
exclusion quality in the post-CDI period, the frequency of exceeding analyst forecasts using
positive exclusions is lower in the post-CDI period. This paper contributes to the voluntary
disclosure and regulation literatures by providing empirical evidence that SEC interpretative
guidance is effective in shaping firms’ disclosure practices, and that relaxed guidance both
expanded the disclosure and improved the quality of accounting information.

iv

Essay 2: In this paper, I examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provision on nonGAAP earnings disclosures. The extant literature documents that the voluntary adoption of
clawback provisions improves financial reporting quality by increasing the costs of misstating
GAAP earnings. However, managers may respond to perception of reduced discretion over
GAAP reporting by increasing their reliance on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I find that
managers more frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings after the voluntary adoption of clawback
provisions, relative to a propensity-matched sample of control firms. In addition, I find that the
quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions deteriorates after voluntarily adopting clawbacks,
consistent with a more opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. My results extend the growing
literature on clawback adoption and suggest that the improvement in GAAP reporting quality
associated with clawbacks may be achieved at the expense of deterioration in the quality of nonGAAP earnings. This unintended consequence has implications related to the mandatory
adoption of clawbacks required under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
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Essay 1
Does SEC Interpretive Guidance Affect Firm Behavior?
Evidence from Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure
1. Introduction
U.S. capital markets are based on extensive disclosure regulation and enforcement. While
recent empirical disclosure literature provides evidence on the costs and benefits of increased
level of disclosure regulation (Bushee and Leuz 2005; Engel, Hayes and Wang 2007), little is
known about relaxed disclosure requirements. In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Division of Corporate Finance (DCF) issued Compliance and Disclosure
Interpretations (CDI) to implement the relaxation of current policy guidelines on Regulation G
and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K by granting registrants extensive discretion as to how they
adjust for recurring items in non-GAAP earnings in the documents filed with the SEC. In this
paper, I examine the effect of relaxed interpretive guidance on the use of non-GAAP disclosure.
I find the relaxed SEC staff interpretations issued in 2010 regarding non-GAAP financial
measures changed SEC registrants’ voluntary disclosure practice in two areas. First, the freedom
allowed firms to expand their disclosure after the issuance of SEC staff interpretation in 2010.
Second, the expanded disclosure resulted in improved quality of the accounting information.
In January 2010, the DCF announced new CDIs that included the relaxation of existing
interpretive guidance issued in 2003 without a formal change in actual regulation. 1 The prior
guidance imposed significant administrative burdens on firms adjusting for recurring items. The
new interpretations eliminated these administrative burdens and allowed firms to exclude those

1

During the 2009 AICPA National Conference, Ms. Meredith Cross, director of the DCF, expressed concerns that
many companies were unwilling to disclose non-GAAP financial measures in their filings because of restrictions
made by the 2003 guidance.
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recurring items as long as they do not describe them as non-recurring, infrequent or unusual. 2
More importantly, the new interpretations reflect a relaxation of the staff’s skeptical attitude
toward the use of non-GAAP financial measures. 3 The shift in the SEC staff’s attitude was
viewed as a significant change that would affect non-GAAP disclosure practice in the earnings
press release and the SEC filings (Bischoff, Cohen, Davenport, and Trotter 2010). This change in
interpretation provides a rare opportunity to examine the effect of relaxed regulation on
registrants’ disclosure practices.
It is unclear whether relaxed guidance would affect firms’ non-GAAP reporting decisions.
While relaxed guidance on non-GAAP earnings disclosure is likely to encourage firms to
disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, it is possible that firms might not respond to the
guidance at all. For instance, Brown, Christensen, Elliott, and Mergenthaler (2012) show that a
sharp decline in non-GAAP reporting during the period of intense regulatory oversight in 2002
and early 2003 was followed by a significant increase in non-GAAP reporting from 2003 to 2005
when there was no change in regulatory action. This suggests that firms might have optimally
disclosed non-GAAP earnings regardless of regulations on the use of non-GAAP earnings.
While it is worthwhile examining the effect of interpretative guidance on the frequency of
non-GAAP disclosure, the more important question is whether relaxed interpretive guidance
affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings. One might conjecture that the extensive discretion in
adjusting for recurring items permitted under the new guidance is likely to encourage
2

The prior guidance required public companies to “meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of any measure
that excludes recurring items,” especially for non-GAAP performance measures. This language is omitted in the new
guidance. It simply states that “the fact that a registrant cannot describe a charge or gain as non-recurring, infrequent
or unusual, however, does not mean that the registrant cannot adjust for that charge or gain. Registrants can make
adjustments they believe are appropriate, subject to Regulation G and the other requirements of Item 10(e) of
Regulation S-K.” (CDI 102.03)
3
For example, Latham & Watkins LLP stated, “The CDIs reflect a more general relaxation of the staff’s prior, and
at times somewhat skeptical, attitude toward the use of non-GAAP financial measures, particularly in reports or
registration statements filed with the SEC.”
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opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure, which may impair the quality of non-GAAP earnings. On
the other hand, Heflin and Hsu (2008) argue that Regulation G also discouraged firms from using
non-GAAP earnings to communicate their core or permanent earnings because Regulation G
imposed significant costs, such as additional administrative burdens, on non-opportunistic nonGAAP reporters. Relaxed application of regulations on non-GAAP disclosure potentially reduces
such costs of non-opportunistic non-GAAP reporters, likely resulting in higher quality nonGAAP earnings. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether relaxed interpretive guidance
improves or impairs non-GAAP earnings quality.
To determine whether relaxed interpretive guidance significantly impacts firms’ disclosure
choices, I examine the relative frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings. Following Doyle et
al. (2003), I obtain actual earnings (street earnings) from the Unadjusted I/B/E/S Detail History
files to proxy for non-GAAP earnings. I identify 67,879 firm-quarter observations from the first
calendar quarter of 2006 to the fourth calendar quarter of 2011. After controlling for the
determinants of non-GAAP earnings disclosure such as GAAP earnings informativeness and
strategic considerations for non-GAAP reporting, I find that the frequency of non-GAAP
disclosure significantly increases after the issuance of new CDIs, consistent with SEC staff
interpretation altering SEC registrants’ voluntary disclosure practice. 4 It suggests that a relaxed
interpretation of non-GAAP disclosure regulation encouraged firms to use non-GAAP financial
measure in the post-CDI period.
To investigate whether the increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency is motivated by
managers’ desire to mislead or better inform investors, I examine the effect of interpretive
4

Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that GAAP earnings are less informative for high-technology firms, rapidly
growing firms, highly leveraged firms, firms with high earnings volatility, and firms with greater amounts of special
items. They also find that firms reporting earnings decreases and firms whose GAAP earnings miss the most recent
consensus analyst forecast of quarterly earnings are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings.
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guidance on the relative quality of non-GAAP exclusions. Defining a higher quality exclusion as
being more transitory and having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al.,
2003; Kolev et al., 2008), I find non-GAAP exclusions become more transitory in the post-CDI
period, which indicates that the quality of non-GAAP exclusions improves after the SEC relaxed
its interpretations on non-GAAP disclosure regulations. I further investigate the improved quality
of non-GAAP exclusions by examining the relative quality of exclusions for two groups: (1)
firms that had not disclosed non-GAAP earnings in the pre-CDI period and started to issue nonGAAP earnings in the post-CDI period (Starting Reporter) and (2) firms that continuously and
frequently report non-GAAP earnings in both the pre- and post-CDI periods (Frequent
Reporter). I find that, in the post-CDI period, the exclusion quality of a Starting Reporter is
significantly higher than it is for a Frequent Reporter. Moreover, I do not find evidence of an
exclusion quality difference for a Frequent Reporter between the pre- and post-CDI periods.
This result suggests that the relaxed new guidance reduced the cost of non-opportunistic nonGAAP disclosure by eliminating unnecessary language from the prior guidance, thereby
encouraging firms with informative motives, which were previously discouraged from reporting
non-GAAP earnings due to high administrative burdens, to now report non-GAAP earnings in
the post-CDI period.
In an additional analysis, I find a significantly positive coefficient on other exclusions and an
insignificant coefficient on special items, suggesting that the improvement in the average quality
of non-GAAP exclusions is driven by other exclusion quality. I also examine the association
between exclusion quality improvement and board independence. Frankel, McVay, and Soliman
(2011) find that greater board independence is associated with higher quality non-GAAP

4

exclusions and is a substitute for regulatory scrutiny. 5 Consistent with this result, I find the
positive relation between exclusion quality and future operating income in the post-CDI period
only for the group of firms with a percentage of independent board members higher than the
industry mean. This suggests that managerial opportunistic use of non-GAAP exclusions can be
mitigated in the presence of strong board oversight within a relaxed regulatory environment.
Finally, I examine whether more frequent non-GAAP disclosure is used to meet or beat analyst
forecasts. Consistent with higher quality non-GAAP earnings representing reduced opportunism
on the part of managers, I find that the frequency of meeting or beating analyst forecasts using
non-GAAP disclosures is lower in the post-CDI period. 6
This paper contributes to voluntary disclosure and disclosure regulation literatures. First, I
provide evidence that SEC staff interpretations, not actual regulation, effectively regulate
registrants’ voluntary disclosure practices by showing that the 2010 CDIs significantly increase
the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure and improve the quality of non-GAAP exclusions. While
most research examining the SEC’s regulatory impact focuses on regulations which went
through the regular rulemaking procedure, SEC staff interpretations are not subject to the
sunshine provision. For example, SEC interpretive guidance is exempt from notice-and-comment
requirements, therefore lacking the force or effect of law (Fraser 2010). Due to this nonbinding
nature, it is not clear ex ante whether interpretive guidance changes registrants’ disclosure
practices. This paper provides the first evidence that nonbinding SEC interpretive guidance
effectively affects firms’ disclosure practices.
5

Jennings and Marques (2011) provide evidence that investors are also misled by non-GAAP disclosures made by
firms with weaker corporate governance before Regulation G, indicating the substitution between regulatory
scrutiny and corporate governance.
6
In the pre-CDI period, the probability of exceeding analyst forecasts increases by 9.15% when a firm reports
positive exclusions. This probability, however, decreases by 2.89% in the post-CDI period, consistent with a
reduction in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting and relaxing excessive regulation on voluntary disclosure enhancing
the quality of the information.
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Second, my results provide insight into how regulators can shape disclosure regulation using
interpretive guidance. Even though regulations are not comprehensive, if a regulatory body
changes its stance on a piece of regulation by issuing interpretive guidance, it may create similar
legal environments as if there had been a change in actual regulation.
Finally, this paper provides a useful insight into the consequences of relaxed reporting
requirements on voluntary disclosure. Bushee and Leuz (2005) show that mandating SEC
reporting requirements for firms that were to be traded on the OTCBB forced a large number of
those firms into a less regulated market. Shroff et al. (2013) also show that allowing more
discretion in freely disclosing information prior to an equity offering is associated with lower
information asymmetry and a lower cost of equity capital. Similarly, this paper contributes to the
voluntary disclosure literature by using a unique setting of relaxed reporting requirements and
provides evidence that these relaxed reporting requirements may improve the quality of
voluntarily disclosed information.
Section 2 provides a literature review and institutional background on non-GAAP financial
measures and Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample selection and
data description. Section 5 explains the research design and presents the empirical results.
Section 6 provides additional tests and Section 7 concludes the paper.

6

2. Literature Review and Institutional Background
2.1 The Costs and Benefits of Disclosure Regulations
Corporate scandals in early 2000 and the recent financial crisis have caused regulators to call
for greater transparent financial reporting system, reporting requirements and disclosure
regulations. Prior literature examines the impact of increased levels of reporting requirements
and disclosure regulation. While substantial net benefits of mandating SEC reporting
requirements are documented, it also provides evidence that it imposes significant costs,
especially on smaller firms, which are likely to avoid registering with the SEC as a result of
mandating SEC reporting requirements (Bushee and Leuz 2005; Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007;
Leuz, Triantis, and Wang 2008; Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman 2009). For instance, Bushee and
Leuz (2005) examine the costs and benefits of a regulatory change that mandates OTCBB firms
to comply with SEC reporting requirements, documenting significant costs of the imposing
disclosure requirements for smaller firms. 7 Similarly, Engel et al. (2007) examine public firms’
going-private decisions after the passage of SOX. While SOX significantly increased the
compliance costs, which are considered a fixed component, the benefits of SOX vary across
firms. As a result, it is argued that net benefits from being public are relatively little for small
firms. They find that the number of firms carrying out going private transactions increases in the
post-SOX period. On the other hand, Leuz et al. (2008) investigate causes and economic
consequences of going-dark decision. 8 They find that increased going dark decisions are
attributable to SOX, particularly increased compliance costs. The SEC delayed compliance with
Section 404 of SOX for non-accelerated filers and this bright line size threshold provides
7

They document that the imposition of SEC disclosure regulation force smaller firms with lower outside financing
needs off the OTCBB.
8
Going-dark deregistration represents a situation where firms stop filing with the SEC, but continue to publicly
trade.
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incentives for small firms to remain small, which are the unintended consequences of SOX (Gao
et al. 2009).
Overall, these studies provide evidence on the cause and effect of increased level of
disclosure regulation. In general, they document that mandating SEC reporting requirements
(increased disclosure regulation) impose significant costs on small firms, forcing them into less
regulated market. While extensive literature on disclosure regulation has been studied regarding
the increased SEC reporting requirements, less is known for relaxed disclosure requirements
because it is rare that the SEC relaxes reporting requirements.
2.2 Non-GAAP Disclosure Literature
Non-GAAP earnings (also known as pro forma earnings) are alternative earnings measures of
firm performance. While GAAP earnings are prescribed by Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, there is no standard for non-GAAP earnings. Firms voluntarily disclose this
alternative earnings metrics in earnings press release. There are, in general, two views on the
disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. First, managers use non-GAAP financial measures
to communicate firms’ fundamental performances to the extent that GAAP earnings contain
transitory items. 9 Firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro
forma earnings, which are more useful to investors in firms with low GAAP earnings
informativeness (Lougee and Marquardt 2004), consistent with non-GAAP earnings providing
better information for investors. Similarly, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al.
(2003) provide evidence that non-GAAP earnings are more value-relevant than GAAP earnings.
A second view is that managers improperly use non-GAAP measures in order to mislead
investors by excluding recurring items from GAAP earnings. Morgenson (2013) reports in her
9

Such transitory items include profits on disposals, extraordinary expenses, restructuring charges, legal settlement
costs, etc.
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recent NY Times article that Twitter aggressively excluded stock compensation, intangible
amortization or impairment charges to transform its loss into earnings. Consistent with this
criticism, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms which report earnings decreases are more
likely to release non-GAAP earnings than firms which report earnings increases. Items excluded
from non-GAAP earnings have predictability for future cash flow from operations and stock
returns, suggesting managers’ opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings (Doyle et al. 2003).
Managers’ use of non-GAAP figures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks is suggested in
Bhattacharya et al. (2004) and Doyle et al. (2013).
The SEC intervened into non-GAAP reporting in December 2001 by issuing a warning
regarding the improper use of non-GAAP earnings to obscure GAAP earnings performance, and
subsequently adopted Regulation G in 2003. Prior research finds a decrease in the frequency of
non-GAAP disclosure after the passage of Regulation G (Bowen et al., 2005; Entwistle et al.,
2006; Marques 2006; Heflin and Hsu 2008) and a lower frequency of meeting or beating
earnings benchmarks (Heflin and Hsu 2008). For example, Heflin and Hsu (2008) document that
the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure and exclusion magnitude have significantly decreased as
a result of Regulation G, concluding that Regulation G reduced truthful managers’ willingness to
communicate core earnings through non-GAAP earnings disclosure even though it discouraged
some managers from opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings.
Kolev et al. (2008) examine the effect of Regulation G on the quality of non-GAAP earnings
exclusions. Defining higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as being more transitory, they regress
future operating income on an interaction term consisting of a Regulation G indicator variable
and the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions. They find a significantly negative coefficient on the
interaction term, indicating that, on average, regulation on non-GAAP earnings improved the
9

quality of non-GAAP exclusions by discouraging firms with lower quality non-GAAP
exclusions in the pre-Regulation G period from releasing non-GAAP earnings. Heflin and Hsu
(2008) and Kolev et al. (2008) provide evidence that Regulation G has curtailed managers’
opportunistic uses of non-GAAP earnings.
2.3 Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations on Non-GAAP Financial Measures in 2010
The SEC has expressed its concerns over firms’ improper uses of non-GAAP figures. 10 As
directed by Section 401(b) of SOX, the SEC published a number of rules on the use of nonGAAP financial measures (Regulation G and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K). Regulation G
applies when an SEC registrant publicly discloses non-GAAP financial measures. It requires
public companies that disclose or release non-GAAP financial measures to show (1) the most
directly comparable GAAP financial measure along with the non-GAAP measure and (2) a
reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measure to the comparable GAAP financial measure.
In addition, Regulation G prohibits SEC registrants from disclosing a non-GAAP financial
measure if it contains a material misstatement or it neglects to state a material fact that would be
necessary to make non-GAAP financial measures not misleading.
The SEC also amended Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K to impose additional disclosure
requirements and restrictions when companies include non-GAAP financial measures in their
SEC filings. Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K requires public companies to (1) present the most
directly comparable GAAP financial measure with equal or greater prominence, (2) explain why
management believes the non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors, and (3) provide
10

In December 2001, the SEC issued a warning with regards to non-GAAP figures, stating that “presentation of
financial results that is addressed to a limited feature of a company’s overall financial results ... raises particular
concerns ... To inform investors fully, companies need to describe accurately the controlling principles [and] the
particular transactions and the kind of transactions that are omitted”. It also states that “a non-GAAP figure would
not be deemed misleading if the company disclosed in plain English how it deviated from GAAP and the amount of
each of those deviations”.

10

a statement of the additional purposes for which management uses the non-GAAP financial
measures. In addition to these requirements, Item 10(e) prohibits public companies from
adjusting, eliminating, or smoothing items identified as non-recurring, infrequent, or unusual if it
is reasonably likely to recur within two years or if a similar charge or gain occurred within the
previous two years.
Along with the adoption and the amendment of regulations on non-GAAP financial measures,
the SEC issued guidance on Regulation G and Regulation S-K in 2003. The guidance includes
requirements to adjust for recurring items and a prohibition of non-GAAP earnings per share
measures in the SEC filings. In a 2009 public speech at the AICPA National Conference, SEC
staff members of the DCF noted that they believed that the previous guidance in the 2003 FAQs
precluded registrants from providing meaningful information in periodic reports and other SEC
filings. As a result, the DCF issued new interpretations on the non-GAAP financial measures in
SEC filings and other public disclosures on January 15, 2010. Wayne Carnall, Chief Accountant
in the DCF, stated that the new CDIs were issued to accomplish three objectives: “(i) eliminate
any actual or perceived restrictions in the FAQs on the disclosure of non-GAAP information that
were not consistent with the actual rules, (ii) clarify the SEC’s interpretations, and (iii) centralize
in one location the SEC’s interpretations.”
The primary change in the new CDIs includes eliminating words from Questions 8 and 9 of
the 2003 FAQs (prior guidance) that discouraged companies from disclosing non-GAAP
financial measures in their SEC filings. This elimination is viewed as the single most important
change in the 2010 interpretations. Question 8 of the 2003 FAQs states that:
“Companies should never use a non-GAAP financial measure in an attempt to
smooth earnings. Further, while there is no per se prohibition against removing a
11

recurring item, companies must meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of
any measure that excludes recurring items, especially if the non-GAAP financial
measure is used to evaluate performance.”
This burden of demonstrating the usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures is perceived as a
major obstacle that discouraged companies from disclosing non-GAAP earnings in the SEC
filings (Sandler et al. 2010). 11 For instance, SEC staff members review registrants’ filings that
contain non-GAAP financial measures. On June 15, 2006, the SEC asked TIBCO Software Inc.
to provide the SEC with additional information about why they believed a non-GAAP financial
measure disclosed in the 8-K filings was useful to investors, in compliance with Question 8 of
the FAQ. 12 The new CDIs eliminate this language from the prior guidance and provide more
discretion to managers when they adjust for recurring items in non-GAAP financial measures.
This elimination is perceived as a significant change in how SEC staff members view non-GAAP
financial measures. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers stated in its 2011 report that “the
updated staff guidance will have a significant effect on the way the SEC’s rules are applied by
companies and interpreted by the SEC staff in the context of non-GAAP performance measures
that exclude recurring items.” Bischoff et al. (2010) emphasized that “companies will have
much more flexibility in disclosing non-GAAP financial measures in press releases and SEC
filings”. With this elimination, the new guidance clearly states that companies may adjust for

11

The burdens [what burdens?] include that public companies (1) demonstrate the usefulness of any non-GAAP
financial measure that excluded recurring items, and (2) indicate that inclusion of such measures may be misleading
without disclosure addressing how and why management used the measures and the material limitations associated
with their use. In addition to this requirement, companies are not required to limit their use of non-GAAP financial
measures to the purpose of managing their business only under new CDIs. Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K requires
registrants to disclose (a) the reasons why management believes that non-GAAP measures are useful to investors
and (b) the purpose for which management uses the measures.
12
See Appendices A and B.
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recurring items, so long as the recurring items are not labeled as non-recurring. For example,
Question 102.03 of the new CDIs reads as follows:
“The prohibition is based on the description of the charge or gain that is being
adjusted. It would not be appropriate to state that a charge or gain is non-recurring,
infrequent or unusual unless it meets the specified criteria. The fact that a registrant
cannot describe a charge or gain as non-recurring, infrequent or unusual, however,
does not mean that the registrant cannot adjust for that charge or gain. Registrants
can make adjustments they believe are appropriate, subject to Regulation G and the
other requirements of Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K.”

The prior guidance also requires that management use the non-GAAP financial measures in
managing its business. Question 8 of the 2003 FAQs states that:
“Inclusion of such a measure may be misleading absent the following disclosure:
•

the manner in which management uses the non-GAAP measure to conduct or
evaluate its business”

The new CDI question 102.04, however, states that public companies do not have to use the nonGAAP financial measures in conducting or evaluating their business. 13 Question 102.04
specifically states that it allows a registrant to use a non-GAAP financial measure that is not used
by management in managing its business. Also, it says that Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K states

13

CDI 102.04 Question: Is the registrant required to use the non-GAAP measure in managing its business or for
other purposes in order to be able to disclose it? Answer: No. Item 10(e)(1)(i)(D) of Regulation S-K states only that,
"[t]o the extent material," there should be a statement disclosing the additional purposes, "if any," for which the
registrant's management uses the non-GAAP financial measure. There is no prohibition against disclosing a nonGAAP financial measure that is not used by management in managing its business. [Jan. 2010]

13

only that “[t]o the extent material, there should be a statement disclosing the additional purpose,
if any, for which the registrant uses the non-GAAP financial measure.”
These changes in SEC staff interpretations on non-GAAP financial measures provide a rare
opportunity to examine the impact of interpretive guidance. It has been difficult to empirically
examine the effect of interpretive guidance on voluntary disclosure because most interpretive
guidance (1) is issued immediately after new regulations are adopted, (2) deals with subjects
whose economic consequences are hard to economically quantify, and/or (3) merely reaffirms
and rearranges existing guidance in a better format. 14 New CDIs on non-GAAP financial
measures, however, overcome these difficulties in examining the impact of interpretive guidance
on voluntary disclosure.
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One example of case (1) is interpretive guidance on non-GAAP financial measures issued in 2003. One example
of case (2) is climate change related disclosure requirements issued in 2010, which are difficult to quantify. Finally,
interpretive guidance on Regulation FD issued in 2009 simply reaffirms or slightly expands prior guidance.
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3. Hypothesis Development
3.1 The Effect of New CDIs on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure
Prior literature finds that regulations on non-GAAP financial measures (Regulation G,
amendments to item 10(e) of Regulation S-K, and the addition of item 12 to Form 8-K) increased
costs of both opportunistic and non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures (Heflin and Hsu 2008).
Regulations raised the costs of non-GAAP disclosure by requiring extensive reporting
requirements. While the regulations provide extensive rules, they did not provide a rule about
making adjustments for recurring items; therefore, the SEC issued guidance on how to adjust for
recurring items. Prior guidance mandates that firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings in their SEC
filings meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures that
exclude recurring items. This requirement is considered a significant obstacle which discouraged
firms from disclosing non-GAAP earnings in their SEC filings (Sandler et al. 2010; Bischoff et
al. 2010). However, new guidance in 2010 eliminated this restrictive language from the prior
guidance, possibly reducing the costs of non-GAAP disclosure and resulting in more frequent
non-GAAP disclosure in the post-CDI period. Therefore, firms might start reporting non-GAAP
earnings more frequently under this relaxed regulatory environment.
It is also possible that firms do not respond to this relaxed interpretive guidance at all. For
example, Brown et al. (2012) show that the number of non-GAAP disclosures had temporarily
declined from 2002 to 2003 due to the passage of SOX and the SEC’s approval of Regulation G,
but soared up again in 2004 and 2005. This may suggest that firms optimally disclose non-GAAP
earnings regardless of regulations. This is also consistent with the view that SEC staff members
issued interpretive guidance to adjust their views on non-GAAP disclosure based on existing
disclosure practices, rather than to change registrants’ disclosure practices. Therefore, firms may
15

not respond to the relaxed interpretive guidance since the staff interpretations reflect the current
disclosure practices, not vice versa. In addition, since the new CDIs in 2010 only include
changes in interpretive guidance as opposed to changes in actual regulation, it is not clear
whether firms will have an observable response to them. To date, there has been no such
evidence documented about how changes in interpretive guidance affect firms’ disclosure
decisions.
I therefore make no directional prediction with regards to any changes in the frequency of
non-GAAP earnings disclosure after the issuance of new CDIs and present the first hypothesis in
the null form:
H1: The issuance of new CDIs has no effect on the frequency of non-GAAP earnings
disclosure.

3.2 The Effect of New CDIs on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
Prior literature on non-GAAP disclosure assesses the quality of non-GAAP earnings by
investigating whether non-GAAP exclusions have implications for future earnings performance
(Doyle et al. 2003). Managers who disclose non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors are
likely to exclude items only if those items are transitory, so that non-GAAP measures better
reflect core earnings. If excluded items are transitory, they will have no predictive power for
future performance; thus “high-quality” non-GAAP exclusions are those that have no association
with future performance. On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more
likely to exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings; thus “low-quality” non-GAAP
exclusions are those that have a significant association with future performance.
16

The effect of relaxed interpretive guidance on non-GAAP earnings quality is similarly
unclear. Relaxed interpretive guidance may increase or decrease the quality of non-GAAP
exclusions, depending on the relative cost reductions in: (1) opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure
and (2) non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure. Heflin and Hsu (2008) suggest that not only did
non-GAAP regulations discourage opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings, but they also
curtailed firms’ willingness to use non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors (nonopportunistic non-GAAP disclosure). Relaxed interpretive guidance might, however, reduce the
costs of non-GAAP disclosure.
Managers who disclose non-GAAP financial measures to better inform investors are likely to
exclude items only if they are transitory so that non-GAAP measures better reflect core earnings.
This type of manager was discouraged from using non-GAAP earnings after Regulation G due to
the high administrative burdens and reputational costs associated with non-GAAP disclosure
(Heflin and Hsu 2008). Relaxed interpretive guidance is likely to lower such costs of nonopportunistic non-GAAP disclosure by reducing the additional administrative burdens and
reputational costs. This allows managers with informative (non-opportunistic) motives to use
non-GAAP earnings more frequently in order to better inform investors under a relaxed
regulatory environment, resulting in higher exclusion quality in the post-CDI period relative to
the pre-CDI period. Therefore, the relaxation of interpretive guidance might be able to attract
managers who did not report non-GAAP financial measures due to high disclosure costs in the
pre-CDI period to now disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period.
On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more likely to exclude less
transitory items from non-GAAP earnings, resulting in lower quality exclusions. Since relaxed
interpretive guidance allows more discretion in adjusting for recurring items, it might also
17

increase opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure by giving opportunistic managers more freedom to
adjust recurring items and easily misleading investors with non-GAAP earnings under a relaxed
regulatory environment. If an increase in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting is dominated by
opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure, then the relaxation of interpretive guidance may result in a
proliferation of opportunistic non-GAAP earnings to mislead investors, which is likely to lower
the quality of non-GAAP exclusions in the post-CDI period.
Finally, the relaxed interpretive guidance may not affect a firm’s non-GAAP reporting
behavior at all. As previously explained, the new CDIs do not involve any actual regulatory
changes, but merely represent changes in the interpretation of these regulations. If the initial
regulation is clear enough so that managers do not need the regulators’ subsequent
interpretations, then managers are not likely to respond to any changes in the SEC’s interpretive
guidance related to these regulations.
Therefore, the second hypothesis is stated in the null form:
H2: The issuance of new CDIs is not associated with the quality of exclusions from nonGAAP earnings.
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4. Sample Description
I obtained data from the Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File and I/B/E/S Split Unadjusted
File from the first quarter of 2006 to the fourth quarter of 2011. 15 Following prior research, I use
I/B/E/S actual earnings as the proxy for non-GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle
et al. 2003; Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev et al. 2008). The primary concern with using I/B/E/S
actual earnings as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings is whether street earnings disclosed by
analysts are a good proxy for pro forma earnings released by managers. 16 While I/B/E/S actual
earnings is not a perfect proxy for non-GAAP earnings, the use of I/B/E/S actual earnings as
opposed to manager-issued non-GAAP earnings is the more conservative choice because
managers exclude recurring items opportunistically whereas analysts exclude them when it better
predicts future firm performance (Barth et al. 2011). Gu and Chen (2004) also provide evidence
that analysts include nonrecurring items in street earnings when they are persistent; furthermore,
these nonrecurring items that are included have higher valuation multiples than recurring items
that are excluded from street earnings. Therefore, it is likely to bias my result towards no
association between future earnings and non-GAAP exclusions. As long as the coefficient on
non-GAAP earnings is significant, then the inferences made from these tests will not change. I
use three different samples: (1) a full sample consisting of observations without missing value
for all variables, (2) a non-zero exclusion sample consisting of observations only where non15

Due to the unavailability of data, I use the Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File instead of the Preliminary History
Quarterly Compustat File (Kolev et al. 2008). Since Kolev et al. (2008) use the Preliminary History Quarterly
Compustat File for as-first-filed financial statement figures, the use of Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File will not
differ from that from the Preliminary History Quarterly File.
16
I acknowledge that other empirical research works provide some evidence that I/B/E/S actual EPS is significantly
different from pro forma earnings disclosed by firms. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that there is a significant
difference (4 cents difference) between pro forma EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS. They show that 65% of pro forma
EPS amounts are equal to the I/B/E/S actual EPS amounts, and that managers (pro forma EPS amounts) exclude
more expenses than analysts (I/B/E/S EPS amounts) do. Using more recent data, Brown et al. (2012) report that the
mean pro forma EPS (about 31 cents) is higher than the mean I/B/E/S EPS (about 28 cents). To address this issue, I
collect non-GAAP disclosures from 8-K filings using PERL to test H1 and the results are statistically similar.
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GAAP earnings are different from GAAP earnings, and (3) a constant sample consisting of firms
with data from 1998 to 2011.
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5. Research Design and Empirical Results
5.1 The Effect of New CDIs on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure
To test H1, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings in a
given quarter. Consistent with Heflin and Hsu (2008), I define a non-GAAP earnings disclosure
quarter as any quarter when the actual EPS, as reported by I/B/E/S, is different from the basic
EPS, as reported in Compustat. I model the probability of non-GAAP disclosure in a given
quarter as a function of new CDI, as follows: 17
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑞 �
= 𝛼0 + 𝜶𝟏 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰𝒒 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ
+ 𝛼5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞

(Eq. 1)

+ 𝛼8 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼12 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞
+ 𝛼13 𝑄𝑇𝑅4 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞

The variables included in the model are as follows:

Prob(non-GAAP q )
newCDI q
Ln(Total Assets) q
Intangibles q
Tech
Sales Growth q
Market-to-Book q
Leverage q
Earnings Volatility q
SI q
Special Item q
Bigbath q

= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP
earnings in a given quarter and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if quarter q is between the first
calendar quarter of 2010 and the fourth calendar quarter of 2011
(inclusive), and 0 otherwise
= a natural log of total assets
= intangible assets divided by total assets
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is a high-tech industry as
defined in Francis and Schipper (1999) and 0 otherwise
= quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis
= price/(common equity/outstanding shares)
= total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity
= standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous
eight quarters
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm reports a special item in
quarter q and 0 otherwise
= a dollar amount of special items
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special
item and negative earnings in the same quarter and 0 otherwise
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Lougee and Marquardt (2004) examine the economic determinants of pro forma reporting; Marques (2006) and
Heflin and Hsu (2008) examine the effect of SEC intervention on the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures.
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Loss q
QTR4
Industry Fixed Effect

= an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items
for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable for the fourth fiscal quarter
= Fama-French 48 industry classfication

The dependent variable, Prob(non-GAAP q ), is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm
discloses non-GAAP earnings in a given quarter and zero otherwise. newCDI q is an indicator
variable that equals one if quarter q is between the first quarter of 2010 and the fourth quarter of
2011 (inclusive), and zero otherwise. 18
The model includes control variables that extant literature has identified as factors affecting
non-GAAP disclosure. I include Ln(Total Assets) q because large firms tend to disclose nonGAAP earnings more frequently. Firms with high intangibles or high-tech firms have less
informative GAAP earnings, and therefore are more likely to release pro forma earnings than
other firms (Lougee and Marquardt 2004). As such, I include the amount of intangible assets
(Intangibles q ) and a high-tech indicator variable (Tech). Since growth firms are more likely to
report pro forma earnings, sales growth rate (Sales Growth q ) and market-to-book ratio (Market
to Book q ) are included in the model (Lougee and Marquardt 2004).
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) document that higher leverage ratios are associated with the
increased likelihood of earnings management, which may result in less informative GAAP
earnings; therefore, I use Leverage q as an additional control. Earnings Volatility q is used as a
control because investors tend to demand additional information when earnings are volatile
(Defond and Hung 2003). Firms reporting large special items are more likely to disclose nonGAAP earnings. Following Heflin and Hsu (2008), I include two controls for special items: (1)

18

newCDI variables are based on calendar quarter, not fiscal quarter
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SI q and (2) Special Item q . 19 In addition, a big bath indicator variable (Bigbath q ) is included
because firms are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings when they report a one-time charge.
Since firms missing earnings benchmarks are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, I
include the Loss q indicator variable. Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that firms are more likely to
disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth quarter than in other quarters, so I include the QTR4
indicator variable.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in testing H1 and H2. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the concern about
observations with extreme values. 42.5% of firms in my sample report non-GAAP earnings.
Mean (median) GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are 0.244 (0.210) and 0.316 (0.240). The mean
amount for: non-GAAP exclusion is 0.052, special items is 0.016, and other exclusions is 0.034,
respectively. Among the full sample, 37.6% of firm-quarters report special items and 41%
exclude items other than special items.
Table 2 exhibits the differences of variables (means and medians) across two time periods
(pre-CDI and post-CDI period). Mean (median) non-GAAP earnings has significantly increased
from 0.302 (0.240) to 0.338 (0.240). However, the mean non-GAAP exclusion amount has
significantly decreased from 0.054 to 0.05 while mean special items and other exclusions are not
significantly different between the two periods. Total assets and sales growth rates have also
significantly increased between the two periods and earnings have become more volatile,
increasing from 0.023 to 0.026. Finally, future operating income (Fopi) has increased
significantly over time from 0.963 to 1.320. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) provide evidence that
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In addition to these measures, Heflin and Hsu (2008) include the magnitude of industry mean special items
because it explains a significant portion of the probability of disclosing non-GAAP earnings. Including this variable
does not change the inferences of this paper.
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firms with high earnings volatility or high-growth firms are more likely to engage in non-GAAP
reporting because investors demand additional information to help them interpret GAAP
earnings. In general, Table 2 suggests that firms disclose smaller amounts of non-GAAP
exclusions in the post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI period, even though managers have
greater flexibility to be opportunistic in the post-CDI period.
The results for H1 are presented in Table 3. Standard errors are adjusted based on the HuberWhite sandwich estimate of variances and clustered by firm. I find the coefficient on newCDI,
α1 , to be significantly positive (0.210), suggesting that managers release non-GAAP measures
more frequently after the issuance of new CDI. The percentage change in non-GAAP reporting

between the two periods is economically and statistically significant. The probability of reporting
non-GAAP earnings is 8.23% higher in the post-CDI period than in the pre-CDI period. This
indicates that the SEC staff interpretations allow registrants to change their non-GAAP reporting
practices. I conduct the same tests with an S&P500 and a constant sample, as presented in
columns 2 and 3, respectively. These results are very similar to those from the full sample.
With respect to the control variables, the results are, in general, consistent with the findings
from prior research. Focusing on the full sample results, firm size, ln(Total Assets) q , is positively
related to the probability of non-GAAP disclosure (the estimated coefficient is 0.151). Consistent
with GAAP earnings of high-technology firms being less informative, high-technology firms are
more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings (0.575). Sales growth rate (Sales Growth q ) is
positively associated with non-GAAP disclosure in all three samples, suggesting that the higher a
firm’s sales growth rate, the more likely it is to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 20 SI q is
significantly positive (0.927), consistent with firms that report special items being more likely to
20

These results are consistent with Lougee and Marquardt (2004), Marques (2006), and Heflin and Hsu (2008).
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disclose non-GAAP earnings. A negative coefficient on Special Item q indicates that the larger
the income-decreasing special item is, the more likely firms are to disclose non-GAAP earnings.
While the coefficient on Bigbath q (-0.136) is negative in the full sample, it is insignificant in
column 2 and marginally negative in column 3. The positive coefficient on Loss q (0.140)
suggests that firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings when they miss GAAP
earnings benchmarks. Finally, the positive coefficient (0.152) on QTR4 suggests that firms are
more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth fiscal quarter.
The results presented in Table 3 are consistent with the view that staff interpretations on nonGAAP reporting effectively change non-GAAP reporting practices by firms. Relaxed
interpretive guidance reduced the potential costs imposed on managers associated with the use of
non-GAAP earnings, allowing managers to disclose non-GAAP information more frequently.
Increases in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure can, however, be the result of either
opportunistic or non-opportunistic managers. Since the purpose of relaxing the interpretive
guidance on Regulation G was not to suggest that registrants could use non-GAAP earnings as
they had done before Regulation G, it is necessary to examine how exclusion quality changed
following the issuance of the new CDIs. 21 Opportunistic managers who stopped providing nonGAAP earnings after the initial SEC intervention in 2003 might have started to release nonGAAP earnings after the issuance of the new CDIs in 2010 in attempts to mislead investors
through non-GAAP earnings, indicating lower quality non-GAAP exclusions following the
issuance of the new CDIs. On the other hand, non-opportunistically-motivated managers might
have started to release non-GAAP earnings after the issuance of the new CDIs because they can

21

Ms. Cross, director of the DCF, indicated at the 2009 AICPA National Conference that she was not suggesting
that revision of interpretive guidance on non-GAAP financial measures means that companies go back to their nonGAAP reporting practices that existed before Regulation G.
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now better communicate core earnings to investors, indicating higher quality exclusions
following the new CDI issuance. Therefore, exclusion quality tests will verify the type of
managers who are, on average, most influenced by relaxed interpretive guidance.
5.2 The Effect of New CDIs on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
To test H2, I define higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as being more transitory and
having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al., 2003; Kolev et al., 2008).
Following Kolev et al. (2008), I use future operating income (earnings per share from operations),
summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1 as the dependent variable for the test
of exclusion quality. One advantage of using future EPS from operations as a dependent variable
is that Compustat excludes nonrecurring special items but includes recurring items which may be
classified as other exclusions from non-GAAP earnings (Kolev et al., 2008). I estimate the
following ordinary least squares regression with errors clustered by CUSIP to eliminate any
residual dependence due to firm-specific effects: 22
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼
+ 𝜶𝟒 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞
+ 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞
+ 𝛼9 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

(Model 2)

Control variables included in the models are as follows:

Sale Growth q
Market-to-book q
Ln(Total Assets) q
Earnings Volatility
Loss q
Ln(Age) q

= quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis
= price/(common equity/outstanding shares)
= natural log of total assets in millions and corresponds to quarter q
= standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous
eight quarters
= an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary
items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise.
= natural log of the number of years since a company first appeared in
Compustat
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Petersen (2009) demonstrates that it generates unbiased estimators and I use this method in order to be consistent
with Kolev et al. (2008)
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Following Kolev et al. (2008), I use future operating income (Fopi), which is defined as
earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1,
as the dependent variable for the test of exclusion quality. As explained earlier, non-GAAP
earnings (Non-GAAP Earnings q ) are proxied by I/B/E/S actual earnings and non-GAAP
exclusions (Non-GAAP Exclusions q ) are defined as non-GAAP earnings less income before
extraordinary items per share. The main variable of interest is the interaction between newCDI
and Non-GAAP Exclusions q . I expect 𝛼4 to be positive if relaxed interpretive guidance

encourages non-opportunistically motivated managers to release non-GAAP earnings which they

believe better reflect their performance. On the other hand, a negative result on 𝛼4 suggests that

relaxed interpretive guidance encourages opportunistically motivated managers to disclose nonGAAP measures after the issuance of new CDIs.
Doyle et al. (2003) argue that growth firms tend to have lower future operating cash flows

because of long-term investments and increases in working capital and consequently they find a
negative association between sales growth rate and future performance. In addition, prior
empirical work finds that the market-to-book ratio is positively correlated to future earnings and
non-GAAP reporting decisions. Therefore I include controls for the sales growth rate
(SalesGrowth q ) and the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-book q ). I included the natural log of
total assets to control for firm size. Firms with less persistent earnings could be perceived as
having lower quality earnings, creating a demand for additional information (Lougee and
Marquardt 2004).To control for this effect, I include Earnings Volatility q and Loss q . I include
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Ln(Age) q to consider the potential effects of firm age on non-GAAP exclusions and future
earnings. 23
The results of H2 are presented in Table 4. Focusing on the full sample (column 1), 𝛼1 is

significantly positive (2.342). 24 Doyle et al. (2003) and Kolev et al. (2008) interpret a negative
relation between non-GAAP exclusions and future operating income as evidence that the

excluded items are recurring in the future. I find the coefficient on Non-GAAP Exclusions q , 𝛼3 ,
is -0.609 in Table 4, suggesting that one dollar of excluded expenses in the current period is
likely to incur 60.9 cents of expenses over next four quarters in the pre-CDI period. If the new
CDIs have improved exclusion quality, the exclusions should be less negatively correlated with
future operating income in the post-CDI period than pre-CDI period (𝛼4 >0). If the new CDIs

have encouraged firms to opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings, the relation between
exclusions and future operating income should be more negatively correlated following the
issuance of the new CDIs (𝛼4 <0). The coefficient on NewCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions q, 𝛼4 , is

0.245, suggesting that the new CDIs on non-GAAP disclosures improve the quality of non-

GAAP exclusions. It indicates that one dollar of excluded expenses in the current period is
associated with 36.4 (-60.9+24.5) cents of expenses over the next four quarters. This result holds
in the non-zero exclusion and constant samples with similar magnitudes, as presented in columns
(2) and (3), respectively, of Table 4.
Sales Growth q and Market-to-Book q are positively related to the future operating income
(0.044 and 0.022, respectively). Firm size (Ln(Total Assets) q ) is also significantly positively
associated with future operating income. The earnings persistence variables (Earnings
23

Doyle et al. (2003) include total accruals as a control variable because accruals will reverse in the future.
Including total accruals does not change the inferences of this paper.
24
If earnings are perfectly permanent, the estimated coefficient of 𝛼1 would be 4 because future operating income is
summed over the four quarters from q+1 to q+4.
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Volatility q and Loss q ) are negatively related to future operating incomes, suggesting the less
persistent earnings are, the lower the future operating income is. Finally, I document a
significantly positive association between firm age (Ln(Age) q ) and future operating income
(0.142).
Taken together, my findings from H1 and H2 are consistent with the view that an
overreaction to Regulation G led to a diminished information environment and the staff
interpretations which relax the enforcement of Regulation G effectively change registrants’ nonGAAP reporting practices. A higher frequency and improved quality of non-GAAP disclosure
following the issuance of new CDIs is consistent with an increase in the ‘informative’ use of
non-GAAP reporting following the issuance of the new CDIs. While the SEC in 2001
successfully discouraged some opportunistically-motivated managers from improperly using
non-GAAP earnings, it also discouraged some managers with informative motives from
communicating firm performance through non-GAAP earnings. (Heflin and Hsu 2003; Kolev et
al. 2008).
This paper complements the findings in Kolev et al. (2008) and Heflin and Hsu (2008) by
documenting that a relaxed regulatory environment allows non-opportunistically motivated
managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, effectively communicating core or
permanent earnings with non-GAAP financial measures. Two important insights for regulators
are: (1) their goals can be achieved through interpretive guidance without actual changes in
regulation; and (2) relaxed reporting requirements come with lower costs of non-opportunistic
disclosure, resulting in enhanced information environments (Doogar et al. 2010) 25.

25

Doogar et al. (2010) examine the costs imposed by crisis-induced overregulation in the audit field. Their results
are consistent [consistent with what?] that overregulation (Auditing Standard 2) induced by SOX resulted in
inefficient audit resource allocation.
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5.3 Starting vs. Continuing Non-GAAP Reporters
Managers’ decisions to disclose non-GAAP earnings depend on the costs and benefits of the
disclosure (Kolev et al. 2008), which are likely to vary based on managerial motivation to either
mislead or better inform investors with non-GAAP disclosures. Increased frequency (H1) is
consistent with managers viewing non-GAAP disclosure as less costly after the issuance of the
new CDIs and improved quality (H2) indicates that non-GAAP earnings are more informative in
the post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI period.
There are at least two explanations for the increased frequency (H1) and improved quality
(H2) of non-GAAP disclosure. One explanation is that firms with non-opportunistic motives,
which had not disclosed non-GAAP earnings in the pre-CDI period, began reporting non-GAAP
earnings in the post-CDI period. Alternatively, firms that have continuously disclosed nonGAAP earnings may report higher quality non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period. To
eliminate this alternative explanation, I examine the relative quality of non-GAAP exclusions in
the post-CDI period between two groups: (1) firms that had not disclosed non-GAAP earnings in
the pre-CDI period and started to issue non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period (Starting
Reporter) and (2) firms that continuously and frequently report non-GAAP earnings in both preand post-CDI period (Frequent Reporter). 26
Panel A of Table 5 presents the result of this analysis. First, 𝛼4 is 0.513, suggesting that in

the post-CDI period the exclusion quality of Starting Reporters is significantly higher than that
of Frequent Reporters. This result, however, does not eliminate the alternative explanation
because it is still possible that the exclusion quality of Frequent Reporters might improve in the
26

Firms are classified as Starting Reporters if they had not reported non-GAAP earnings in the pre-CDI period at
all, but started to disclose non-GAAP earnings more than or equal to once in the post-CDI period. On the other hand,
firms are classified as Frequent Reporters if they disclosed non-GAAP earnings more than 50% of the pre- or postCDI period.
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post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI period. Therefore, I reexamine the relative exclusion
quality only for Frequent Reporters. The result for Frequent Reporters is presented in Panel B
of Table 5. I do not find evidence of a difference in exclusion quality for Frequent Reporters
between the pre- and post-CDI period (𝛼4 =0). This result suggests that the relaxed interpretive

guidance reduced the cost of non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure by eliminating the

restrictive language from the prior guidance and further encouraging firms with informative
motives, which were previously discouraged from reporting non-GAAP earnings due to high
administrative burdens, to now disclose non-GAAP earnings under the relaxed regulatory
environment in the post-CDI period.
5.4 Decomposition of Total Exclusions into Special Items and Other Exclusions
I decompose non-GAAP earnings exclusions into special items and other exclusions to
examine whether the exclusion quality improvement is due to either special items or other
exclusions. Following Doyle et al. (2003), I define special items (Special Items) as operating
income less GAAP earnings and other exclusions (OtherExclusion) as non-GAAP exclusions
less special items (defined above), and then estimate the following least squares regression
model:
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞

+ 𝛼4 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼5 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ � 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

Doyle et al. (2003) provide evidence of little predictability of special items but report high
future predictive ability of other exclusions. They report that special items are not related to
future cash flow from operations (CFO) while other exclusions are significantly negatively
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related to future CFO. On the other hand, Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin (2002) provide
evidence that special items are positively associated with future earnings. McVay (2006)
provides evidence that managers shift recurring expenses into special items, resulting in
improvement in the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Kolev et al. (2008) show that Regulation G
improves the quality of other exclusions, but the quality of special items has become worse over
time. This suggests that the new CDIs may have different implications for special items and
other exclusions.
Table 6 presents the results using special items and other exclusions. Referring to the main
effects, low-quality exclusions are driven by other exclusions as opposed to special items. The
interaction between newCDI and Special Items (𝛼5 ) is marginally negative or insignificantly

related to future operating income. On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term
between newCDI and Other Exclusions ( 𝛼6 ) is significantly positively related with future

operating income (0.586, 0.561, and 0.697, respectively), suggesting that other exclusion quality
significantly improves in the post-CDI period while that of special items does not. The positive
coefficient on 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 and the insignificant or marginally negative
coefficient on 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 imply that managers are less likely to designate

recurring expenses as other exclusions than as special items following the issuance of the new
CDIs. Relaxed interpretive guidance on non-GAAP disclosure allows managers to exclude more
transitory items from other exclusions, resulting in higher quality other exclusions.
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6. ADDITIONAL TESTS
6.1 The Effect of Board Independence on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
Frankel et al. (2011) provide evidence that more independent boards can curb the
opportunistic use of non-GAAP exclusions through stronger monitoring over earnings-related
disclosures and that increased scrutiny by the SEC over non-GAAP disclosures substituted for
board oversight following Regulation G. This implies that exclusion quality improvement
following the issuance of new CDIs may be driven by firms with a more independent board due
to the substitution effects between regulatory scrutiny and board oversight.
I obtain director data from The Corporate Library. Board independence is defined as the
percentage of outside directors on the board. To examine the role of independent boards on the
quality of non-GAAP exclusions, I separate the full sample into two subsamples: (1) those firms
with a percentage of independent board members greater than or equal to the industry mean and
(2) those firms with a percentage of independent board members less than the industry mean.
The results of the board analysis are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. I find a
significantly positive coefficient on 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝛼4 =0.372) only in the
subsample of firms with a greater percentage of independent board members than the industry

mean, suggesting that better corporate governance leads managers to use non-GAAP exclusions
to better inform investors when more discretion is given to them. This result not only supports
the notion that managerial opportunism is curbed in the presence of strong board oversight, but it
is also consistent with strong board oversight encouraging managers to use non-GAAP earnings
in an informative way. Overall, the results of Table 7 support the argument that board oversight
is a substitute for regulatory scrutiny.
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6.2 Meeting/Beating Analyst Forecasts
Managers opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts (Doyle
et al. 2013). Since more transitory exclusion items is a result of less opportunistic use of nonGAAP earnings, managers are expected to less opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings to
exceed analyst forecasts in the post-CDI period. Following Doyle et al. (2013), I define
PosExclUse as an indicator variable equal to one if the amount of non-GAAP exclusions is
greater than zero and zero otherwise. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 8.
Consistent with the results in Doyle et al. (2013), I find a significantly positive coefficient on
PosExclUse (0.255, z-stat=17.54), as presented in column 1. Prior to the issuance of the new
CDIs, the probability of exceeding analyst forecasts increases by 9.15% when firms exclude
expenses to define non-GAAP earnings. Table 8 exhibits that the frequency of meeting or
beating analyst forecasts using positive exclusions is lower in the post-CDI period than the preCDI period (𝛼3 = -0.078). This probability decreases by 2.89% in the post-CDI period. The

results from Table 8 are consistent with higher quality non-GAAP earnings being representative
of less opportunistic non-GAAP earnings, and they further support the argument that relaxing

excessive regulation on voluntary disclosure may improve the quality of the information
contained in the voluntary disclosure.
As Table 6 shows that improved quality of non-GAAP exclusions were concentrated on other
exclusions, I expect the frequency of exceeding analyst forecasts to be lower in the post-CDI
period only when a firm reports positive other exclusions, but not special items. Column 2 of
Table 8 shows results consistent with this prediction. I find a significantly negative coefficient
( 𝛼5 = -0.069 with p-value=0.0001) on newCDI × PosOtheExclUse, but an insignificant

coefficient (z-stat = -0.74) on newCDI ×PosSpecialItemUse. These results corroborate my main
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conclusion that non-GAAP exclusion quality, especially the quality of other exclusions,
improves significantly by relaxing the interpretive guidance on non-GAAP disclosure regulations.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
In 2010, SEC staff members within the Division of Corporate Finance issued new
interpretive guidance on non-GAAP regulations, which superseded prior guidance issued in 2003.
The new guidance relaxed the previous interpretive guidance on how to adjust for recurring
items in a non-GAAP financial measure. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of
relaxed staff interpretations (CDIs) on non-GAAP disclosures.
This paper provides evidence that a relaxation of prior guidance on non-GAAP disclosure
encouraged managers to release non-GAAP information more frequently. Managers are 8.23%
more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI
period. The result is consistent with staff interpretations effectively changing registrants’
voluntary disclosure practices. I also examine the quality of non-GAAP exclusions to see
whether the relaxed interpretive guidance on non-GAAP disclosure affects exclusion quality. In
particular, the non-GAAP exclusion quality of firms that started to report non-GAAP earnings
(Starting Reporters) in the post-CDI period is higher than that of firms that have continuously
reported non-GAAP earnings (Frequent Reporters). This suggests that the relaxed interpretive
guidance in 2010 reduced the cost of non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure, resulting in both a
higher frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings.
The quality of non-GAAP exclusions, especially other exclusions, improves after the
issuance of relaxed interpretive guidance. In further analysis, I find that the exclusion quality
improvement is concentrated in firms with boards comprised of more independent directors,
which is consistent with strong board oversight curbing the opportunistic use of non-GAAP
earnings and encouraging managers to better inform investors. Finally, I find that the frequency
of meeting or beating the consensus analyst forecast is lower in the post-CDI period, as
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compared to the pre-CDI period, further supporting the results of higher exclusion quality in the
post-CDI period.
These findings are relevant to regulators and standard setters. While the lack of transparency
surrounding the rulemaking procedures and the nonbinding nature of interpretive guidance raise
a question about the effectiveness of guidance on registrants’ disclosure practices, this paper
provides evidence that nonbinding SEC staff interpretations affect registrants’ disclosure
practices. In addition, I provide useful insight into the consequences of relaxed regulation on
voluntary disclosure. Bushee and Leuz (2005) show that mandating SEC reporting requirements
for firms that were traded on the OTCBB forced a large number of those firms into a less
regulated market. Shroff et al. (2013) also show that allowing more discretion in freely
disclosing information prior to an equity offering is associated with less information asymmetry
and a lower cost of equity capital. Similarly, this paper contributes to the literature on voluntary
disclosure and accounting quality by using a unique setting of relaxed reporting requirements to
show that relaxed reporting requirements improve information environments.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
N

Mean

1st Q

Median

3rd Q

Std. Dev.

Prob(Non-GAAP)

67,408

0.425

0

0

1

0.494

GAAP Earning

67,408

0.244

0.010

0.210

0.500

1.225

Non-GAAP Earnings

67,408

0.316

0.050

0.240

0.520

0.512

Non-GAAP Exclusions

67,408

0.052

0

0

0.030

0.246

Special Items

67,408

0.016

0

0

0

0.085

SI

67,408

0.376

0

0

1

0.484

Other Exclusions

67,408

0.034

0

0

0.020

0.155

OE

67,408

0.410

0

0

1

0.492

newCDI

67,408

0.384

0

0

1

0.486

Ln(Total Assets)

67,408

6.939

3.112

5.582

6.857

8.132

Intangibles

67,408

0.155

0.006

0.069

0.252

0.189

Tech
Market-to-Book

67,408
67,408

0.249
2.960

0
1.227

0
1.935

0
3.243

0.432
3.541

Sales Growth

67,408

0.344

-0.079

0.177

0.658

1.621

Leverage

67,408

0.945

0.034

0.394

1.035

1.808

Earnings Volatility

67,408

0.024

0.004

0.009

0.023

0.045

Bigbath

67,408

0.109

0

0

0

0.312

Loss

67,408

0.241

0

0

0

0.428

QTR4

67,408

0.260

0

0

1

0.439

Fopi

68,567

1.042

0.010

0.750

1.860

2.074

Ln(Age)

68,567

2.772

2.303

2.773

3.258

0.645

Variable

Prob(Non-GAAP)
GAAP Earning
Non-GAAP Earnings
Non-GAAP Exclusions
Special Item
SI
Other Exclusions
OE
newCDI
Ln(Total Asset)s
Intangibles
Tech
Market-to-Book
Sales Growth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
Bigbath
Loss
QTR4
Fopi
Ln(Age)

= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP earnings in quarter q and 0 otherwise.
= earnings per share before extraordinary items
= I/B/E/S actual earnings per share
= Non-GAAP Earnings – GAAP Earnings
= Operating Income less GAAP Earnings where Operating Income is earnings per share from operations
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a special item in quarter q and 0 otherwise
= Non-GAAP Exclusions – Special Items
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm excludes items other than special items in quarter q and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise
= a natural log of total assets in millions in quarter q
= intangible assets divided by total assets
= an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999);
= price/(common equity/outstanding shares);
= quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis
= total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity
= standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special items and negative earnings in the same quarter
and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable for 4th quarter
= earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1
= a natural log of the number of years since a company first appeared in Compustat
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Time Subgroups
Two-tailed p-value
Pre-CDI period

Post-CDI period

Statistical Difference

2006 Q1 through 2009Q4

2010 Q1 through 2011 Q4

t-test/Wilcoxon Rank sum

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

t-test

Wilcoxon

Prob(Non-GAAP)

0.388

0.000

0.483

0.000

0.000

0.000

GAAP Earning

0.242

0.210

0.286

0.210

0.000

0.000

Non-GAAP Earnings

0.302

0.240

0.338

0.240

0.000

0.000

Non-GAAP Exclusions

0.054

0.000

0.050

0.000

0.087

0.000

Special Items

0.016

0.000

0.015

0.000

0.283

0.000

SI

0.358

0.000

0.405

0.000

0.000

0.000

Other Exclusions

0.033

0.000

0.035

0.000

0.152

0.000

OE

0.373

0.000

0.468

0.000

0.000

0.000

Ln(Total Assets)

6.851

6.770

7.082

7.023

0.000

0.000

Intangibles

0.156

0.070

0.154

0.066

0.340

0.591

Tech

0.251

0.000

0.245

0.000

0.000

0.076

Market- to-Book

3.041

2.034

2.829

1.771

0.000

0.000

Sales Growth

0.235

0.157

0.517

0.209

0.000

0.000

Leverage

0.952

0.395

0.934

0.392

0.000

0.266

Earnings Volatility

0.023

0.009

0.026

0.010

0.000

0.000

Bigbath

0.109

0.000

0.109

0.000

0.000

0.000

Loss
Fopi
QTR4

0.246
0.963
2.755

0.000
0.860
2.773

0.234
1.320
2.832

0.000
1.345
2.890

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
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TABLE 3
The Effect of New CDIs on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure
Probit Regression
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2011 (2006 Q1–2011 Q4).

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑞 �
= 𝛼0 + 𝜶𝟏 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰𝒒 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞
+ 𝛼5 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜- 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞
+ 𝛼8 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚 + 𝛼11 𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ + 𝛼12 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞
+ 𝛼13 𝑄𝑇𝑅4 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞

newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0
otherwise; Ln(total assets): natural log of total assets; Intangibles: Intangible assets divided by total assets; Tech: an
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); Market-tobook: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: the increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: Total
liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8
quarters; SI: an indicator variable that equals one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special
Item: the amount of reported special items; Bigbath: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reports a negative special
items and negative earnings in the same quarter; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary
items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; QTR4: an indicator variable if the quarter is the 4th quarter and 0
otherwise.
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent.
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP.
Dependent Variable

Probability of non-GAAP disclosure in a quarter
Full Sample
S&P 500 firms
Constant Sample
Coef.
Robust z
Coef.
Robust z
Coef.
Robust z

Intercept
newCDI
Ln(Total Assets)
Intangibles
Tech
Sales Growth
Market-to-book
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
SI
Special Items
Bigbath
Loss
QTR4

-1.844
0.210
0.151
0.343
0.575
-0.043
-0.006
0.007
1.224
0.927
4.872
-0.136
0.140
0.152

***
***
***
***
***
*
*

***
***
***
***
***
***

-12.37
13.20
14.79
3.73
6.89
-1.91
-1.69
0.75
4.51
42.77
28.11
-3.91
4.61
13.13

-1.799
0.183
0.179
0.684
0.973
0.112
-0.005
-0.005
2.442
1.178
3.763
0.027
0.376
0.077

**
***
***
*
***

***
***

**
*

-2.52
2.99
2.57
1.93
2.72
1.19
-0.29
-0.12
1.07
15.98
8.32
0.14
2.05
1.69

-1.609
0.166
0.139
0.387
0.578
-0.026
-0.020
0.013
1.483
1.021
4.409
-0.099
0.182
0.128

***
***
***
***
***

***

**
***
***
*
***
***

Marginal Effect of
newCDI on the
probability of nonGAAP disclosure

8.23%

6.70%

6.53%

Industry Fixed
Observations
Pseudo R2

Yes
67,408
0.235

Yes
5,347
0.320

Yes
41,121
0.256
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-6.81
8.33
9.47
2.86
4.46
-0.78
-2.91
0.88
2.55
35.66
21.08
-1.86
3.92
8.49

TABLE 4
The Effect of New CDIs on Exclusion Quality
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2006 Q1–2010 Q4).

𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼3 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛼12 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

Future Operating Income: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter
q+1; newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0
otherwise; Non-GAAP Earnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; Non-GAAP Exclusions: Non-GAAP
Earnings - GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Market-to-book:
price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Total Assets): log of total assetsin quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard
deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if
earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Ln(Age): Log of the number of years
since the company first appeared in Compustat.
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent.
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP.

Future operating Income

Dependent Variable:
[1]

[2]

[3]

Full Sample

Non Zero Exclusion

Constant Sample

Coef.

Intercept
Non-GAAP Earnings
newCDI
Non-GAAP Exclusions
newCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions
Sales Growth
Market-to-Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Age)
Time Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
R2

t

-0.263
2.342
-0.100
-0.609
0.245
0.044
0.022
0.127
-0.021
-0.105
0.142

***
***
***
**
***
***
***

***
***

-0.63
38.8
-3.17
-8.60
2.26
5.65
8.51
15.34
-0.54
-3.46
7.06

Coef.

t

0.727
2.289
-0.173
-0.570
0.249
0.034
0.026
0.151
-0.104
-0.072
0.088

***
***
***
**
***
***
***
*
*
**

0.94
28.73
-3.31
-7.82
2.22
3.34
7.14
10.95
-1.74
-1.74
2.52

Coef.

t

-0.107
2.341
-0.154
-0.560
0.312
0.053
0.044
0.137
-1.259
-0.066
0.154

***
***
***
**
***
***
***
**

***

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

68,567

24,612

38,078

0.512

0.474

0.520

41

Yes

-0.81
28.34
-3.93
-6.27
2.34
5.05
7.90
10.25
-2.48
-1.46
4.40

TABLE 5
The Exclusion Quality for Starting and Continuing Non-GAAP Reporters
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼3 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛼12 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

Panel A. Model of Future Operating Income on Exclusions and Starter vs. Frequent Reporter in the Post-CDI Period (2010
Q1–2011 Q4)

Future operating Income

Dependent Variable:

Intercept
Non-GAAP Earnings
Starter
Non-GAAP Exclusions
Starter×Non-GAAP Exclusions
Sales Growth
Market-to-Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Age)

Coef.

t

-0.263
2.699
0.855
-0.495
0.513
0.075
0.025
0.175
-0.397
0.040
0.065

-0.63
14.00
0.42
-2.82
2.46
2.13
2.28
5.40
-0.68
0.42
0.67

Time Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
R2

***

***
**
**
**
***

Yes
Yes
2,819
0.6042

Panel B. Model of Future Operating Income on Exclusions only for Continuing Non-GAAP Reporters (2006 Q1–2010 Q4)

Future operating Income

Dependent Variable:

Coef.

Intercept
Non-GAAP Earnings
newCDI
Non-GAAP Exclusions
newCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions
Sales Growth
Market-to-Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Age)
Time Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
R2

t

-0.263
2.315
-0.191
-0.441
-0.120
0.036
0.033
0.105
0.414
-0.041
0.131

***
**
***

*
***
***

**

Yes
Yes
12,425
0.4575
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-0.63
17.20
-2.10
-3.36
-0.11
1.92
3.80
4.12
1.34
-0.66
2.03

TABLE 6
Decomposition of Non-GAAP Exclusions into Special Items and Other Exclusions
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2006 Q1–2010 Q4).

𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼
+ 𝛼5 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞
+ 𝛼8 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼14 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞
+ 𝛼15 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼16 𝑀&𝐴 + 𝛼14 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼15 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

Fopi (Future Operating Income): Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1;
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; GAAP
Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; Non-GAAP Earnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic)
earnings per share; Special Item: Operating Income less GAAP Earnings; Other Exclusion: Total Exclusions less Special Items;
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; Sales
Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Total
Assets): Log of total assets in quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight
quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise;
Ln(Age): Log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat.
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent.
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP.

Future operating Income

Dependent Variable
[1]

[2]

[3]

Full Sample

Non Zero Exclusion

Constant Sample

Coef.

Intercept
Non-GAAP Earnings
Special Item
Other Exclusion
newCDI
newCDI×Special Item
newCDI×Other Exclusion
Sales Growth
Market-to-Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Age)
Time Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
R2

𝛼0
𝛼1
𝛼2
𝛼3
𝛼4
𝛼5
𝛼6
𝛼7
𝛼8
𝛼9
𝛼10
𝛼11
𝛼12

-0.250
2.350
-0.191
-1.024
-0.100
-0.310
0.586
0.044
0.022
0.128
-0.021
-0.110
0.138

t

***

***
***
*
***
***
***
***

***
***

Yes
Yes
68,567
0.513

43

-0.60
38.86
-1.62
-8.06
-3.17
-1.65
3.46
5.65
8.54
15.49
-0.54
-3.56
6.89

Coef.
0.739
2.300
-0.186
-0.913
-0.182
-0.257
0.561
0.035
0.026
0.151
-0.102
-0.097
0.081

t

***

***
***

***
***
***
***
*
**
**

Yes
Yes
24,612
0.475

0.96
28.75
-1.48
-7.45
-3.47
-1.35
3.24
3.37
7.16
10.99
-1.73
-2.25
2.33

Coef.
-0.107
2.347
-0.188
-0.948
-0.157
-0.155
0.697
0.053
0.044
0.138
-1.228
-0.076
0.151

t

***

***
***

***
***
***
***
**

***

Yes
Yes
38,078
0.521

-0.81
28.38
-1.26
-5.88
-4.03
-0.68
3.25
5.06
7.93
10.35
-2.47
-1.63
4.32

TABLE 7
The Effect of Board Independence on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2006 Q1–2010 Q4).

𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼3 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛼12 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

Fopi (Future Operating Income): Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1;
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; GAAP
Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; Non-GAAP Earnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic)
earnings per share; Non-GAAP Exclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings; Special Item: Operating Income less GAAP
Earnings; Other Exclusion: Total Exclusions less Special Items; newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls
between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis;
Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Total Assets): Log of total assets in quarter q; Earnings Volatility:
standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings
before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Ln(Age): Log of the number of years since the company first
appeared in Compustat.
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent.
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP.

Dependnet Variable

Intercept
Non-GAAP earnings
newCDI
Non-GAAP Exclusions
newCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions
Sales Growth
Market-to-Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Age)
Time Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
R2

𝛼0
𝛼1
𝛼2
𝛼3
𝛼4
𝛼5
𝛼6
𝛼7
𝛼8
𝛼9
𝛼10

Future operating Income
[1]
[2]
High Independence
Low Independence
(Board Independence (Board Independence
>=Industry Mean)
<Industry Mean)
Coef.
t
Coef.
t
-0.392
-0.66
-1.203 **
-2.30
2.239 ***
26.89
2.643 ***
25.31
-0.142 **
-2.19
-0.224 ***
-2.67
-0.542 ***
-5.73
-0.462 ***
-3.78
0.372 **
2.46
0.080
0.45
0.074 ***
6.03
0.012
0.76
0.024 ***
6.66
0.021 ***
5.02
0.128 ***
9.05
0.164 ***
8.94
-0.327
-1.37
-1.108 **
-2.26
-0.164 ***
-3.50
0.015
0.23
0.203 ***
6.21
0.059
1.24
Yes
Yes
30,975
0.494

44

Yes
Yes
12,782
0.582

TABLE 8
Probit Regressions of Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations on Exclusion Variables
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2011 (2006 Q1–2011 Q4).

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝐵𝐸)𝑞 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝑼𝒔𝒆𝑞 + 𝜶𝟒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝒒
+ 𝛼5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛼7 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝐵𝐸)𝑞 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒒 + 𝛼5 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝑼𝒔𝒆𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼12 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

MBE: an indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S actual EPS is greater than the median consensus analyst forecast; newCDI: an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; PosExclUse: an indicator variable
equal to one if Non-GAAP Exclusions is greater than zero; PosOtherExclUse: an indicator variable equal to one if Other Exclusions is greater
than zero. PosSpecialItemsUse: an indicator variable equal to one if Special Items are greater than zero. Market-to-book: price/(common
equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): Log of total assets in
quarter q; Profitable: an indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S actual EPS is greater than zero; ROA: GAAP earnings divided by total assets.
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent.
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively.

Prob(MBE) q

Dependent Variable

[1]

[2]

Coef.
Intercept
newCDI
PosExclUse
PosSpecialItemUse
PosOtherExclUse
newCDI*PosExclUse
newCDI*PosSpecialItemUse
newCDI*PosOthe ExclUse
Sales Growth
Market-to-Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Profitable
ROA

𝛼0

t

Coef.

-0.279

***

-12.08

-0.273

***

-11.79

0.079

***

6.40

0.078

***

6.31

0.255

***

17.54
0.059

***

2.61

***

16.36

𝛼1

𝛼2
𝛼3
𝛼4
𝛼5

0.255
-0.078

***

-3.48

𝛼6

-0.025

𝛼7

-0.069

𝛼10

-0.74
***

-2.87

***

17.65

0.357

***

17.58

***

15.94

0.023

***

15.76

-0.015

***

-5.27

-0.017

***

-5.81

0.744

***

48.80

0.740

***

48.54

***

18.48

2.669

***

18.29

𝛼8
𝛼9

t

𝛼11
𝛼12

0.359
0.024

2.689

Observations
Psuedo R2
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71,804

71,804

0.074

0.075

APPENDIX A. TIBCO’S non-GAAP disclosure in the 8-K filings on March 26, 2006
Use of Non-GAAP Financial Information
TIBCO provides non-GAAP net income and net income per share data as additional measures of its operating results. TIBCO believes that nonGAAP financial measures of income provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain additional financial and business
trends relating to the Company’s financial condition and results of operations. For example, the non-GAAP results are an indication of TIBCO’s
baseline performance before gains, losses or other charges that are considered by management to be outside the Company’s core business
operational results. In addition, these non-GAAP results are among the primary indicators management uses as a basis for planning for and
forecasting of future periods. These measures are not in accordance with, or an alternative for, generally accepted accounting principles in the
United States and may be different from non-GAAP measures used by other companies.
TIBCO Software Inc.
Non-GAAP Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations
(unaudited)
(in thousands, except per share data)
Three Months ended
March 5,
February 27,
2006
2005
Non-GAAP (1)
Non-GAAP (1)

Revenue
Cost of revenue
Gross profit
Operating expenses:
Research and development
Sales and marketing
General and administrative
Total operating expenses
Income from operations
Interest and other income, net
Income before income taxes
Provision for income taxes (2)
Net income
Net income per share - Basic

$ 114,580
30,699
83,881

$ 104,146
25,933
78,213

20,855
37,307
8,908
67,070
16,811
3,779
20,590
8,030
$ 12,560

16,187
34,121
9,800
60,108
18,105
2,455
20,560
7,813
$ 12,747

$

$

Shares used to compute net income per share - Basic
$

Shares used to compute net income per share - Diluted

220,170

The following table summarizes the non-GAAP adjustments:

$

0.05
233,675

Three Months ended
March 5,
February 27,
2006
2005

Net income, GAAP
Stock-based compensation
Amortization of acquired intangibles
Provision for income taxes (2)
Net income, non-GAAP
(2)

0.06

0.06
214,751

210,577

Net income per share - Diluted

(1)

0.06

$ 5,601
4,587
3,694
(1,322)
$12,560

$ 10,388
93
3,516
(1,250)
$ 12,747

The estimated non-GAAP effective tax rate of 39% and 38% have been used for 2006 and 2005 respectively, to adjust the provision for
income taxes for non-GAAP purposes.
Three Months ended
March 5, 2006

Net income, GAAP
(a) Stock-based compensation
(b) Amortization of acquired intangibles
(c) Provision for income taxes
Net income, non-GAAP
(2)

$

$

5,601
4,587
3,694
(1,322)
12,560

The estimated non-GAAP effective tax rate for 2006 of 39% has been used to adjust the provision for income taxes for non-GAAP purpose
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APPENDIX B. SEC Comment Letter
VIA EDGAR AND FACSIMILE
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549
Attention: Christine Davis
Re: TIBCO Software Inc.
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended November 30, 2005 Filed February 10, 2006
Form 10-Q for the Fiscal Quarter Ended February 28, 2006 Filed April 14, 2006
Form 8-K filed March 28, 2006
File No. 000-26579
Dear Ms. Davis:
TIBCO Software Inc. (the “Company”) is submitting this letter in response to the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (the “Commission”) letter dated June 15, 2006 (the “Comment Letter”). For your convenience, we have repeated
your comments 1 through 8 below, and the headings and numbered responses in this response letter correspond to the headings
and numbered comments contained in the Comment Letter. Please feel free to contact me at the number at the end of this
response letter with any further questions or comments you may have.
Form 8-K Filed March 28, 2006
5. We believe your presentation of a non-GAAP statement of operations may create the unwarranted impression to investors
that the non-GAAP statement of operations has been prepared under a comprehensive set of accounting rules or principles
while also conveying undue prominence to a statement based on non-GAAP measures. Please remove that presentation, or
explain to us in reasonable detail why its retention is justified in light of these concerns. As a substitute for this presentation
format, you may consider presenting only individual non-GAAP measures (i.e. line items, subtotals, etc.) provided each one
complies with Item 10 of Reg. S-K and the Division of Corporation Finance’s Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Use of
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Question 8.
The Company confirms that it has always intended to comply with Item 10 of Regulation S-K for each non-GAAP measure
presented. In response to the Staff’s comments, the Company has determined that it will not present the table titled “NonGAAP Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations” in future filings. In addition, the Company will replace the table
titled “Reconciliation of Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations to Non-GAAP Condensed Consolidated Statement of
Operations” with the table titled “Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Measures to GAAP.” Following the presentation of GAAP
Consolidated Statement of Operations and Balance Sheets, the Company intends to include the table titled “Reconciliation of
Non-GAAP Measures to GAAP” with a description on why management believes the exclusion of each item from the nonGAAP measures provide useful information to investors and the manner in which management uses the non-GAAP measures to
conduct or evaluate the business. The Company believes that its proposed disclosure enhances the understanding of its financial
results because it helps investors understand how management assesses the Company’s performance and provides a consistent
baseline for historical and prospective comparisons. The Company intends to include for future periods where non-GAAP results
are included the following disclosure in its Forms 8-K:
The Company provides non-GAAP measures for operating income, net income and net income per share data as supplemental
information regarding the Company’s core business operational performance. The Company believes that these non-GAAP
financial measures are an indication of the Company’s baseline performance before gains, losses or other charges that are
considered by management to be outside the Company’s core business operational results. The Company uses core business
operational results for its internal budgeting and measurement purposes and to develop its perspective and understanding of the
Company’s performance historically, currently and prospectively. The core business operational results are also used by the
Company to provide a consistent method of comparison to historical periods and to the performance of competitors and peer
group companies. Accordingly, management excludes from core business operational results gains and losses on equity
investments, costs related to formal restructuring plans, non-cash activities, including stock-based compensation related to
employee stock options, the amortization of purchased intangible assets and charges for acquired in-process research and
development, and the income tax effects of the foregoing, as well as adjustments for the impact of changes in the valuation
allowance recorded against the Company’s deferred tax assets.
The Company believes that providing non-GAAP measures that management uses to its investors is useful because it allows
investors to better understand the Company’s financial performance on a comparative basis for historical and prospective
performance, as well as to evaluate the Company’s performance using the same methodology and information used by the
Company’s management. Non-GAAP measures are subject to material limitations as these measures are not in accordance with,
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or an alternative for, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States and may be different from non-GAAP
measures used by other companies. The non-GAAP adjustments described in this release have historically been excluded by the
Company from its non-GAAP measures. The non-GAAP adjustments, and the basis for excluding them, are outlined below:
Restructuring Activities
The Company has incurred restructuring expenses, included in its GAAP presentation of operating expense, primarily due to
workforce related charges such as payments for severance and benefits and estimated costs of exiting and terminating facility
lease commitments related to a formal restructuring plan. The Company excludes these items, for the purposes of calculating
non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it evaluates the continuing core
business operational performance of the Company. The Company believes that these items do not necessarily reflect expected
future operating expense nor does the Company believe that they provide a meaningful evaluation of current versus past core
business operational results or the expense levels required to support the Company’s operating plan.
Investment Activities
The Company records gains or losses on its equity investments based on its pro-rata share of gains or the net losses of the
investment. These gains or net losses are included in the Company’s GAAP presentation of operating income, net income and net
income per share. The Company’s core business is not to invest in third parties, and such investments do not constitute a material
portion of the Company’s assets. The timing and magnitude of gains and losses are unpredictable, as they are inherently based on
the performance of the third party subject to a particular investment. The Company excludes these items, for the purposes of
calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it evaluates the
continuing core business operational performance of the Company. The Company believes that these items do not necessarily
reflect expected future operating expense or income nor does the Company believe that they provide a meaningful evaluation of
current versus past core business operational results or the expense levels required to support the Company’s operating plan.
Non-Cash Activities
The Company has incurred stock based compensation expense as determined under SFAS 123R for fiscal year 2006, and under
APB 25 for earlier comparable periods in its GAAP financial results. The Company excludes this item, for the purposes of
calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it evaluates the
continuing core business operational performance of the Company, prepares plans and budgets and compares its performance to
historical periods and other companies. The Company believes that its non-GAAP measures excluding stock based compensation
expense are more indicative of the Company’s core business operational results, and provide a more reliable trended measure of
historical and prospective core profitability of the Company. The Company has incurred amortization of intangibles, included in
its GAAP financial statements, related to various acquisitions the Company has made. Management excludes these items, for the
purposes of calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it
evaluates continuing core business operational performance of the Company. The Company believes that eliminating this
expense from its nonGAAP measures is useful to investors as a measurement when comparing historical and prospective results and comparing such
results to competitors and peer group companies because it more clearly describes the Company’s core operational business
results, since the amortization of intangibles will vary if and when the Company makes additional acquisitions.
Acquired In Process Research and Development
The Company recorded charges for acquired in-process research and development (“IPR&D”), included in its GAAP
presentation of operating expense, in connection with its acquisitions. These amounts were expensed on the acquisition dates as
the acquired technology had not yet reached technological feasibility and had no future alternative uses. There can be no
assurance that acquisition of businesses, products or technologies in the future will not result in substantial charges for acquired
IPR&D. Accordingly, acquired IPR&D are non-recurring and generally unpredictable. The Company believes that eliminating
this expense, for the purposes of calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income
per share, is useful to investors.
6. We also note that your presentation lacks substantive disclosure that addresses various disclosures in Question 8 of the FAQ.
For example, your disclosures do not explain the economic substance behind your decision to use the measures, why you believe
the measures provide investors with valuable insight into your operating results, or why it is useful to an investor to segregate
each of the items for which adjustments are made. Additionally, you do not provide any discussion regarding the material
limitations associated with each measure or the manner in which you compensate for such limitations. Note that we believe that
detailed disclosures should be provided for each adjustment to your GAAP results and each non-GAAP measure. Further, please
note that you must meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of any measure that excludes recurring items, especially
if the non-GAAP measure is used to evaluate performance.
Please see the Company’s response in Item 5.
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7. Please explain to us why you believe the exclusion of certain expenses helps focus on “core business operational results”.
In this regard, we note that you should specifically define any reference to “core business operational results” as companies and
investors may differ as to what this term represents and how it should be determined.
The Company respectfully advises the Staff that the Company believes that non-GAAP financial measures of operating income,
net income and net income per share are useful measures for the purposes of evaluating the Company’s historical and current
baseline financial performance as well as its performance relative to its competitors and peer group companies. Accordingly,
management excludes from core business operational results items that management does not believe are reflective of the
Company’s baseline performance, such as gains and losses on equity investments, costs related to formal restructuring plans,
non-cash activities, including stock-based compensation related to employee stock options, the amortization of purchased
intangible assets, charges for acquired in-process research and development and reduction of goodwill and other long-lived
assets, and the income tax effects of the foregoing and the impact of changes in the valuation allowance recorded against the
Company’s deferred tax assets. Specific definitions of those items the Company has historically excluded from its core business
operational results are included in the Company’s response in Item 5.
8. We note that you use a 28% tax rate, which differs from your GAAP tax rate. Please explain to us why you believe this nonGAAP tax rate is more appropriate and explain to us how this rate differs from your GAAP tax rate.
The Company respectfully advises the Staff that the non-GAAP tax rate the Company reported was actually 39%. This rate
reflects adjustments for the tax effects of discrete items excluded from the Company’s core business operational results which
included amortization of intangibles, stock-based compensation expense and the impact of changes in valuation allowance
recorded against the Company’s deferred tax assets. These adjustments are made by the Company to its GAAP results to arrive at
non-GAAP financial measures for evaluating the performance of its core business operational results. Consequently, the
Company also adjusted its GAAP tax rate to determine the non-GAAP tax rate applicable to its core business operational results.
It is also management’s belief that the non-GAAP tax rate provides a more accurate and reliable measure of the Company’s
expected tax expense, because it excludes anomalous factors that do not bear on its core business operational results.
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Essay 2
The Effect of Voluntary Clawback Adoption on Non-GAAP Reporting

1.

Introduction
This paper examines the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on firms’

non-GAAP earnings disclosure practices. Firms adopt clawbacks to recover executive
compensation based on financial performance that is subsequently invalidated, most typically
through an earnings restatement. Clawbacks are intended to discourage intentional misstatement
of accounting information by imposing an ex post penalty on managers, and recent studies
document that financial reporting quality improves after their voluntary adoption (see, e.g.,
Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu, 2012; deHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin, 2013). This evidence suggests
that adopting clawback provisions increases the costs associated with misstating earnings defined
under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, it is possible that managers
adapt to this more restrictive reporting environment by disclosing financial performance
measures that would not be subject to restatement, such as non-GAAP earnings. I therefore
examine whether the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions affects the frequency and
quality of firms’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures.
Non-GAAP (or “pro forma”) earnings disclosures are alternative earnings performance
measures provided by individual firms that attempt to measure “core” earnings form reported
GAAP earnings. Prior research finds that non-GAAP earnings figures are, on average, more
value relevant than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya, Black,
Christensen, and Larson 2003), but there is also evidence that these disclosures are used
opportunistically by managers. For example, Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2003) report that
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items excluded from non-GAAP earnings are predictive of future performance, which suggests
that these expenses are recurring and opportunistically excluded from core or permanent
earnings. In addition, managers appear to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet earnings
benchmarks (Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Black and Christensen 2009).
While prior research shows that clawback provisions improve GAAP earnings quality, it
is unclear how voluntarily adopting these provisions might affect the frequency of non-GAAP
earnings disclosures. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP
disclosure is inversely related to GAAP earnings quality, which suggests that the frequency of
non-GAAP disclosures will decrease as GAAP earnings quality improves following voluntary
clawback adoption. Alternatively, clawbacks serve as an ex ante deterrent of GAAP violations
by increasing managers’ costs of manipulating GAAP earnings for their personal benefit.
Managers may compensate for this perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion by
voluntarily releasing non-GAAP earnings measures to investors, which suggests that voluntary
clawback adoption will increase the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure.
The effect of clawback adoption on the quality of non-GAAP earnings is similarly
ambiguous. On the one hand, Frankel, McVay, and Soliman (2011) find that better corporate
governance is associated with higher quality non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Since clawbacks
are generally viewed as improving governance practices, one might expect an improvement in
the quality of non-GAAP reporting following their adoption. On the other hand, managers may
respond to the increased costs of GAAP earnings misstatements by using non-GAAP earnings
more aggressively since these performance measures are not subject to clawback provisions. 27

27

Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the association between the restatements of non-GAAP reporting and legal
consequences, providing evidence that core and pervasive restatements increase the probability of lawsuits. They
define core earnings as non-GAAP earnings, which is different from the definition I use in this paper. In this paper,
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The quality of non-GAAP earnings may consequently decrease following a voluntary adoption
of clawback provisions.
To examine these effects, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of non-GAAP
earnings disclosure before and after voluntary clawback adoption using two different samples:
(1) a sample consisting of only clawback adopters and (2) a sample where clawback adopters are
matched with non-adopters based on a propensity score matched sample (1:1 matching). The
propensity-score matching procedure mitigates concerns over omitted variables that are
correlated with both clawback adoption decisions and non-GAAP reporting. In addition,
propensity-score matching allows me to use a difference-in-differences research design to
analyze changes in non-GAAP reporting before and after clawback adoption. After controlling
for other determinants of non-GAAP earnings disclosure, I find that firms are significantly more
likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings after they voluntarily adopt clawback provisions.
To investigate whether the increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency is motivated by a
desire to better inform investors or to mislead investors, I examine the quality of non-GAAP
earnings exclusions. Following Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) and Kolev, Marquardt,
and McVay (2008), a higher quality exclusion is defined as being more transitory and having no
predictive power for future operating income. I find that there has been a significant decrease in
the quality of non-GAAP exclusions after a firm voluntarily adopts clawback provisions; i.e.,
future operating income is more negatively correlated with non-GAAP exclusions after adopting
clawback provisions. An increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency combined with a decrease
in non-GAAP exclusion quality is consistent with greater opportunistic use of non-GAAP
non-GAAP earnings (pro forma earnings) refers to an earnings metric a firm calculates by excluding or including
certain items from GAAP earnings. Implicit in this is the assumption that non-GAAP earnings, as defined in this
paper, are not subject to restatements. Therefore, manipulating non-GAAP earnings by excluding certain expenses
would not be subject to clawback provisions.
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earnings disclosures after initiation of voluntary clawback provisions, an outcome contrary to the
intended objective of clawback adoption. This suggests that an increase in the cost of
manipulating GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings can cause opportunisticallymotivated managers to shift their focus from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings.
I confirm this interpretation by performing two additional cross-sectional analyses. If
voluntary clawback adoption results in an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP
disclosure, these effects should be relatively more pronounced for firms with greater incentives
for opportunistic reporting. I proxy for these incentives by determining whether the firm has an
unusually high level of net operating assets (NOA) on its balance sheet and whether the firm has
failed to meet or beat analyst forecasts of earnings, as Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are
more likely to use non-GAAP earnings opportunistically in both of these situations. I find that
the deterioration in the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following voluntary clawback adoption
is significantly greater when existing NOA is high and when firms miss analyst forecasts,
consistent with an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting.
These results contribute to existing literature in several ways. First, the study contributes
to the growing literature on the consequences of clawback adoption. Prior research has
documented significant benefits associated with clawback adoption. For example, Chan, Chen,
Chen, and Yu (2012) find a reduction in the frequency of accounting restatements and higher
earnings response coefficients after voluntary clawback adoption, and deHaan, Hodge, and
Shevlin (2012) report reductions in firms’ benchmark beating behavior and the dispersion of
analyst forecasts. In addition, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) find that clawback adoption
enhances firm value for firms with a history of prior restatements, suggesting that investors view
clawbacks as a credible corporate governance mechanism. In contrast, I document an increase in
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the frequency and a decrease in the quality of non-GAAP earnings, consistent with an increase in
the opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure following clawback adoption. To my knowledge,
this is the first empirical evidence related to any costs associated with voluntary adoption of
clawbacks.
My findings also extend the literature on non-GAAP reporting by providing new
evidence that managers use GAAP and non-GAAP earnings as substitutes to achieve their
financial reporting objectives. For example, Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more
likely to shift to non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts when the cost of within-GAAP
earnings management is high, as indicated by high levels of existing income-increasing accruals
on the balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002). Similarly, my results indicate that when
clawbacks increase the cost of within-GAAP earnings management, managers are more likely to
opportunistically disclose non-GAAP earnings figures. These findings also complement those of
Kolev et al. (2008), who document a substitution effect between non-GAAP earnings exclusions
and within-GAAP classification shifting on the income statement.
My findings also have practical implications for both corporate boards and regulators as
they consider introducing clawback provisions into firms’ financial reporting environments. This
point is especially relevant as the mandatory clawback provisions required by the Dodd-Frank
Act are soon to take effect. While one cannot assume that the effects I observe on non-GAAP
reporting will apply to all adopters, my findings do suggest that mandatory clawback adoption
may result in a shift toward more opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings disclosure.
Regulators may need to consider more comprehensive ways to enhance overall financial
reporting quality before proceeding with plans for mandatory adoption.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on
clawback provisions, and Section 3 outlines my hypothesis development. Section 4 presents the
sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics. In Section 5, I discuss the research design
and the empirical results. I perform additional tests in Section 6 and conclude the paper in
Section 7.
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2.

Background on Clawback Provisions
Clawback provisions allow a firm to recover incentive-based compensation from

corporate executives upon the occurrence of some predefined event, typically an earnings
restatement. The prevalence of voluntary clawback adoption has grown rapidly since 2002, when
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted. The primary objective of SOX was to rebuild
investors’ confidence in capital markets by imposing stricter disclosure requirements about a
firm’s internal control system, and Section 304 of SOX authorized the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to enforce compensation recovery when a publicly traded firm restated
financial statements due to misconduct. More specifically, Section 304 requires CEOs and CFOs
to return to their firms any bonus and incentive-based compensation received and any profits
realized from selling their stock within 12 months of accounting restatements due to material
noncompliance with financial reporting requirements as a result of misconduct. 28 More recently,
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires all public companies to adopt a provision
for the recovery of incentive-based compensation in excess of what would have been paid under
restated financial statements. However, while only CEOs and CFOs are subject to clawback
provisions under SOX, the Dodd-Frank Act broadens its coverage to all executive officers as
defined in Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including the CEO and other
officers who are involved in the process of policy-making within the firm.

28

There was some controversy over whether Section 304 of SOX would be effective in improving investor
confidence. For example, Fried and Shilon (2011) argue that the clawback provisions under SOX are unlikely to be
deployed, resulting in a reduced ex ante deterrent effect, because they are excessively punitive, and Chan et al.
(2012) observe that the SEC did not effectively utilize Section 304 until July 2009. On the other hand, Zheng (2013)
investigates whether the clawback provisions under SOX are related to the likelihood of accounting misstatement
and CEO compensation structures. He finds that the correlation between the likelihood of a misstatement and CEO
in-the-money option value significantly decreases, suggesting that SOX clawback provisions have effectively
mitigated the agency costs of overvalued equity.
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Unlike the recovery provisions described above under SOX or Dodd-Frank, a firminitiated clawback is a contractual provision that requires employees to repay compensation
when specific events occur, typically one of following three categories: (1) performance-based;
(2) fraud-based; and (3) non-compete and restrictive covenants. Performance-based clawback
provisions are applicable to all executives who are awarded incentive-based compensation based
on misstated financial statements. Fraud-based clawback provisions apply only to executives
who committed fraudulent activities or misconduct which subsequently led to restatements.
Clawback provisions often include restrictive covenants non-compete and non-solicitation
clauses, allowing firms to recover compensation from employees. The most common type of
clawback provision is fraud-based (47%), followed by performance-based (34%) (Davis-Friday,
Fried, and Jenkins 2013).
An increasing number of public firms have voluntarily adopted clawback provisions to
recoup performance-based executive compensation based upon financial statements that are
subsequently deemed to be misstated. For example, according to the Corporate Library database,
in 2003 only 14 companies had voluntarily adopted clawback provisions. By the year 2008, 295
out of 2,121 companies (14%) disclosed that they had voluntarily adopted clawbacks. This
increase in the prevalence of voluntary clawback adoption, coupled with eventual mandatory
clawback adoptions under Dodd-Frank, naturally raises the question of how clawback adoption
effects firms’ financial reporting environments, which I discuss in the next section.
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3.

Hypothesis Development
Prior research has examined the consequences of voluntary clawback adoption on various

aspects of firms’ financial reporting environments. 29 For example, Chan et al. (2012), deHaan et
al. (2013), and Chen et al. (2013) all report evidence that the incidence of restatements declines
following voluntary clawback adoption. Consistent with auditors’ perception that clawback
adopters have lower audit risk, Chan et al. (2012) report that auditors charge lower audit fees and
issue their reports on a more timely basis, and deHaan et al. (2013) report a decrease in
unexplained audit fees. Both of these studies also provide evidence that firms’ earnings response
coefficients increase following clawback adoption. In addition, deHaan et al. (2013) and Chen et
al. (2013) report declines in earnings management, as measured by abnormal accruals, and an
increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity following clawback adoption. In sum, the evidence
from prior research is consistent with an overall improvement in the quality of firms’ financial
reporting under GAAP following clawback adoption.
I extend the literature on the consequences of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions
by empirically examining the effect of clawbacks on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP
earnings disclosures. Upon first consideration, it is not obvious that clawback adoption would
have any significant effect on non-GAAP reporting practices since non-GAAP earnings are
subjectively defined, are not audited, and are not subject to restatement. Thus, reporting a nonGAAP earnings figure that selectively excludes certain expenses could not trigger a clawback of
executive compensation, however opportunistically the non-GAAP earnings figure might be
defined by firm managers.
29

A few studies examine the determinants of clawback adoption decision. Brown et al. (2013) find that the firm
size, CEO duality, extraordinary M&A bonus, goodwill impairments, and accounting restatements are associated
with clawback adoption decisions. Barbenko et al. (2013) find that prior executive misbehavior, the governance
structure, and executive compensations are related to adoption of a clawback provision.
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However, prior research has linked non-GAAP reporting to the relative informativeness
of GAAP earnings, thus any improvement in GAAP earnings quality resulting from clawback
adoption may have an indirect effect on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures. Alternatively, the very fact that non-GAAP disclosures are not subject to clawback
provisions may affect the relative usefulness of non-GAAP disclosure as a tool to potentially
mislead investors. I explore both of these possibilities in developing my hypotheses.
3.1 The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure
It is well-known that there are two competing incentives underlying the disclosure of
non-GAAP earnings. The first is that managers want to inform investors by providing them with
a measure of core earnings that is likely to persist in the future. Managers therefore remove nonrecurring items from GAAP earnings to better communicate firm performance. Consistent with
this motivation, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report that nonGAAP earnings are more value relevant than GAAP earnings. In addition, Lougee and
Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure is inversely related
to GAAP earnings quality and that investors view non-GAAP earnings as more useful when
GAAP earnings informativeness is low. If managers are using non-GAAP earnings informatively
and if clawback adoption improves GAAP reporting quality, as documented in the prior literature,
then managers may feel less need to provide investors with an alternative measure of firm
performance through non-GAAP disclosure. This line of reasoning suggests that voluntary
adoption of clawback provisions may result in a decrease in the frequency of non-GAAP
earnings disclosure.
An alternative motivation for releasing non-GAAP earnings is that managers use these
disclosures opportunistically. For example, a number of studies report that non-GAAP earnings
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disclosures are used to meet or beat earnings benchmarks that cannot be reached via GAAP (see,
e.g., Doyle et al. 2013; Black and Christensen 2009; Heflin and Hsu 2008). Prior research has
also documented that recurring expenses are often excluded from non-GAAP earnings to inflate
perceptions of firms’ recurring earnings (see Doyle et al. 2003; Black and Christensen 2009).
Because clawbacks increase the managerial costs of misstating GAAP earnings, thereby reducing
managerial perceptions of reporting discretion under GAAP, managers may be more likely to
attempt to reach financial reporting goals through opportunistic disclosure of non-GAAP
earnings. This scenario suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure will increase after
voluntary clawback adoption.
However, voluntary adoption of clawbacks may signal the board’s commitment to
improving the financial reporting environment overall. Managers with opportunistic motives
may be discouraged from using non-GAAP earnings due to an expectation of heightened
monitoring by the boards following clawback adoption, resulting in a decrease in the frequency
of non-GAAP disclosure.
A further possibility is that “altruistic” managers (i.e., those who use non-GAAP earnings
to better inform investors) may use non-GAAP earnings more frequently to communicate core
earnings to compensate for a perceived reduction in reporting discretion under GAAP after
clawback adoption. This suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure will
increase after clawback adoption.
Finally, it is also possible that clawback adoption does not change managerial behavior
regarding non-GAAP disclosure if the adoption of clawback provisions is merely a signal of a
firm’s existing reporting quality. The signaling theory suggests that firms with high reporting
quality are more likely to voluntarily adopt clawback provisions to communicate their superior
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quality to stakeholders (Chan et al. 2012). Firms with high reporting quality are less likely to be
adversely affected by clawback adoption because managers in those firms are less likely to use
non-GAAP earnings disclosures opportunistically. To the extent that firms with higher financial
reporting quality voluntarily adopt clawback provisions as a credible signal, managers are
unlikely to change their non-GAAP reporting patterns. In addition, since non-GAAP earnings are
not subject to restatement, managers may have little incentive to change their non-GAAP
reporting practicing after clawback adoption.
I therefore make no directional prediction with regard to changes in the frequency of nonGAAP earnings disclosure after a firm voluntarily adopts clawback provisions and present the
first hypothesis in null form:

H1: The voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has no effect on the frequency of
non-GAAP earnings disclosure.

3.2 The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
Prior literature on non-GAAP disclosure assesses the quality of non-GAAP earnings by
investigating whether non-GAAP exclusions have implications for future performance (see
Doyle et al. 2003). Managers who disclose non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors are
likely to exclude items only if those items are transitory, so that non-GAAP measures better
reflect core earnings. If excluded items are transitory, they will have no predictive power for
future performance; thus “high quality” non-GAAP exclusions are those that have no association
with future performance. On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more
likely to exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings; thus “low quality” non-GAAP
exclusions are those that have a significant association with future performance.
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As with H1, voluntary adoption of clawback provisions could arguably increase or
decrease the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions. Managers who are opportunistically
motivated may compensate for the increased costs of manipulating GAAP earnings by excluding
more recurring items from non-GAAP earnings, resulting in lower quality of exclusions. For
example, Doyle, Jennings, and Soliman (2013) find that managers are more likely to use shift
towards the use of non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts when the cost of within-GAAP
earnings management is high, as indicated by high levels of existing income-increasing accruals
on the balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002). Clawback adoption could induce similar behavior
by managers.
However, clawback adoption may signal firms’ commitment to carefully monitor all
aspects of financial reporting, including non-GAAP disclosures, and prior research has shown
that the quality of non-GAAP exclusions is positively correlated with the strength of corporate
governance (see Frankel et al. 2011). This suggests that managers may respond to an
improvement in corporate governance structure by increasing the quality of non-GAAP
exclusions after clawback adoption, regardless of their motivations for non-GAAP disclosure.
Therefore, the second hypothesis is presented in null form:
H2: The voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has no effect on the quality of nonGAAP earnings exclusions.
3.3 Joint Interpretation of Hypothesis Test Results
While clawback adoption may affect the frequency or quality of non-GAAP reporting, it
is necessary to view the results from both hypothesis tests collectively before drawing any
inferences regarding the overall effect of clawbacks on non-GAAP reporting. There are four
possible combinations of results: (1) both the frequency and quality of non-GAAP reporting
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increases; (2) frequency increases but quality decreases; (3) frequency decreases but quality
increases; and (4) both frequency and quality decrease. 30 I interpret these four outcomes as
follows:
Case 1. More frequent and higher quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with an
increase in the ‘altruistic’ (or ‘informative’) use of non-GAAP reporting.

Case 2. More frequent but lower quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with an
increase in the ‘opportunistic’ use of non-GAAP reporting.

Case 3. Less frequent but higher quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with a
decrease in the ‘opportunistic’ use of non-GAAP reporting.

Case 4. Less frequent and lower quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with a
decrease in the ‘altruistic’ (or ‘informative’) use of non-GAAP reporting.

These interpretations are summarized in Figure 1.

30

For simplicity, I omit cases where there is no change in the frequency or quality of non-GAAP reporting.
Instances of no change in frequency accompanied an increase (decrease) in quality would be consistent with an
increase in altruistic (opportunistic) non-GAAP reporting. Instances of no change in quality accompanied by an
increase or decrease in frequency do not allow for clear interpretations.
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4. Sample Selection Criteria and Data Description
My basic empirical approach, which closely aligns with that of deHaan et al. (2012) and
Chan et al. (2012), is as follows. I match each clawback adopter to a non-adopting control firm
using propensity score matching and then perform a difference-in-differences analysis to assess
pre- versus post-adoption changes in non-GAAP reporting. The difference-in-differences design
controls for both cross-sectional and temporal differences between my treatment and control
firms, and propensity score matching helps me to further eliminate cross-sectional differences
between the two groups, especially those that may affect or are correlated with the likelihood of
clawback implementation or non-GAAP reporting.
To identify my treatment sample of clawback adopters, I follow Chan et al. (2012) and
obtain clawback adoption data and other corporate governance characteristics from the Corporate
Library, which covers firms in the Russell 3000 Index. I initially identify 297 non-regulated
firms as having voluntarily adopted clawback provisions during my sample period from 2005 to
2009. I exclude financial firms from the sample because the majority of them mandatorily
adopted clawback provisions under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of
2008. 31 I then hand-collect more detailed information regarding firms’ clawback provisions
from their proxy statements filed with the SEC.
The source of non-GAAP earnings data warrants careful consideration. In contrast to the
prior literature on non-GAAP reporting, which tends to employ either manager-adjusted nonGAAP earnings collected from firms’ press releases (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003, Lougee and
Marquardt 2004) or I/B/E/S actual earnings as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings (e.g., Bradshaw

31

Financial institutions that received TARP funding automatically adopted clawback provisions under EESA of
2008. In addition, financial firms were subject to several additional provisions mandated by the Treasury
Department, such as limits on pay.
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and Sloan 2002, Doyle et al. 2003, Heflin and Hsu 2008, Kolev et al. 2008) as their data source,
my research design employs both measures. In my preliminary analysis, where I use propensity
score matching to identify control firms for my sample of voluntary clawback adopters, I include
I/B/E/S actual earnings as one of many potential determinants of clawback adoption. This design
choice allows me to use the widest sample possible when searching for appropriate control firms.
However, in the main tests of H1 and H2, I use manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings
information collected from firms’ earnings announcements (as filed in Form 8-K with the SEC).
This latter design choice is especially important, as it ensures that the non-GAAP disclosures I
am examining are solely the result of managerial decision-making and are uncontaminated by
analyst adjustments to reported earnings (e.g., Gu and Chen 2004)
I obtain data for the propensity matching procedure and for hypothesis tests from several
sources. Financial data are obtained from the Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File, and nonGAAP earnings information is obtained from both I/B/E/S and firms’ Form 8-K filings with the
SEC. Auditor and accounting restatement information are obtained from Audit Analytics. I
match quarterly Compustat, I/B/E/S, and 8-K data with annual data from Audit Analytics and the
Corporate Library based on the fiscal year; I perform several sensitivity tests regarding this
research design choice in Section 6.
After eliminating firms that do not have the requisite data, the treatment sample consists
of 256 clawback adopters out of 2,238 firms covered in the Corporate Library. Panel A of Table
1 presents the frequency distribution of the sample firms by year. Clawback provisions were
infrequent in 2005, with only 10 firms having adopted clawback provisions, but I observe sharp
increases in adoption frequency during 2007, 2008, and 2009. This increase in the frequency of
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clawback adoption is consistent with findings in prior research (Chan et al 2012; Barbenko et al.
2013).
Panel B of Table 1 compares the means and medians of the sample characteristics of
clawback adopters (5,208 firm-quarters) versus non-adopters (38,466 firm-quarters). I include
variables that have been identified in prior research as important determinants of clawback
adoption and of non-GAAP disclosure, as well as other firm characteristics. As shown in the
Panel B, there are significant differences between clawback adopters and non-adopters.
Clawback adopters are much larger in size than non-adopters: mean (median) total assets of
clawback adopters are $12,318 ($3,702) million, which is six times larger than the mean of
$2,380 ($528) million for non-adopters. Clawback adopters also exhibit higher mean sales
growth rates (0.350 versus 0.300), higher leverage ratios (1.655 versus 1.269), lower earnings
volatility (0.015 versus 0.030), and lower frequencies of losses (0.138 versus 0.300) than nonadopters. In addition, clawback adopters exhibit significantly lower market-to-book ratios, less
negative special item magnitudes, are older, have lower total accruals, and are less likely to
operate in a high-tech industry. Clawback firms are marginally more likely to restate their
financial statements during the sample period from 2004 to 2009 (p-value=0.08). Consistent with
Chan et al. (2012), clawback firms are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors (0.871 versus 0.678),
have more independent directors on the board (0.852 versus 0.811), and have lower insider
holdings (0.069 versus 0.169). Clawback adopters disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently
than non-adopters (68.8% versus 53.9%). In addition, mean non-GAAP earnings and non-GAAP
exclusions of clawback adopters are significantly higher than that of non-adopters (0.510 versus
0.244, and 0.07 versus 0.05 respectively). Mean future operating income (FutureIncome) is also
significantly higher for clawback adopters (2.023 vs. 0.928).
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The numerous differences in the firm characteristics of clawback adopters versus nonadopters, documented above, illustrate why I undertake a propensity-matching approach to my
analysis. A comparison of clawback adopters with the population of all non-adopting firms is
unlikely to shed light on the question of whether clawback adoption impacts future non-GAAP
reporting decisions. I therefore select a single control firm for each clawback adopter by
matching each adopter to the non-adopting firm with the closest predicted value (i.e, “propensity
score”) from a logit model estimation of clawback adoption. The dependent variable is an
indicator variable that equals one if the firm has adopted a clawback provision and zero
otherwise (Claw) and each of the firm characteristics from Panel B of Table 1 are included as
independent variables, as follows:
𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘𝑞+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞
+ 𝛼4 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝐼𝑞
+ 𝛼8 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑞
+ 𝛼12 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼13 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼14 𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑞 + 𝛼15 %𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼16 %𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑞
+ 𝛼17 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑞 + 𝛼18 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼19 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞

(1)

I estimate equation 1 separately for each year from 2005 to 2009, using all firms with
available data, to accurately match the pre-adoption characteristics of clawback firms with those
of non-adopters. More specifically, control firms are matched with clawback adopters based on
firm characteristics measured in the fourth quarter of the year preceding clawback adoption. 32
Selected non-adopters (control firms) are assigned with “pseudo” adoption years. I require both
clawback adopters and non-adopters to have at least one observation before and after the

32

DeHaan et al. (2012) also match clawback firms with non-adopting firms using propensity-score matching and
conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. However, they use 2006 year-end data to match 2007, 2008 and 2009
clawback adopters with non-adopters. In my study, firm characteristics are measured in the prior to voluntary
clawback adoption years are matched with the characteristics of non-adopters in the same year.
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clawback adoption year so that I am able to use the difference-in-difference research design. This
procedure yields 247 pairs of voluntary clawback adopters and non-adopters (1:1 matching).
Panel A of Table 2 reports the logit estimation results by year. The results reveal that
large, mature firms with income-decreasing accruals and lower insider holdings are relatively
more likely to adopt clawback provisions, which is consistent with prior research on the
determinants of clawback adoption. The non-GAAP reporting variables are very weakly
associated with clawback adoption, but not in a consistent manner. For example, NonGAAP is
marginally significantly positive in 2005 and 2008, but NonGAAPExclusion is significantly
negative in 2006 and 2009, which is a conflicting result. I conclude that past non-GAAP
reporting practices are not a primary determinant of the decision to adopt clawback provisions.
Descriptive data related to the success of the propensity matching procedure are
presented in Panels B and C of Table 2. In Panel B, I compare the means and medians of the
independent variables in equation (1) for the clawback adopters and their matched controls. As
shown in Panel B, there are no significant differences in the mean or median of any variable,
which suggests that the treatment and control firms are well-matched on all of these dimensions.
Further, in Panel C I find that the mean (median) difference in propensity scores between the two
groups is -0.002 (0.000) and standard deviation of the difference is 0.005, indicating that there is
no significant difference between the propensity scores of the treatment firms and their matched
controls. I conclude that the propensity-matching procedure has succeeded in identifying
appropriate control firms for each clawback adopter.
Next, I hand-collect non-GAAP earnings data for this sample of 247 treatment-control
matched firm pairs using either 8-K filings or press releases that appeared on the company’s
website. This process ensures that the non-GAAP disclosures I am examining are based on
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manager, rather than analyst, adjustments to GAAP earnings. As shown in Panel D of Table 2, I
was able to obtain non-GAAP earnings from the 8-K or from a press release for 188 treatmentcontrol pairs.
In Panel E, I compare the means and medians of the independent variables in equation (1)
for this smaller sample of clawback adopters and their matched controls. I again find no
significant differences between the treatment and control firms. I use this sample, which relies on
hand-collected non-GAAP earnings data from firms’ 8-K’s and press releases, in all of my
subsequent analyses.
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5. Research Design and Empirical Results
5.1 The Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure and Voluntary Clawback Adoption
To test H1, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings
in a given quarter. I model the probability of releasing non-GAAP earnings as a function of
clawback adoption and other determinants of non-GAAP disclosures that have been identified in
prior literature, as follows: 33
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑞 � = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝑖,𝑞 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑞

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑞 � = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑞 + 𝜶𝟑 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊,𝒒 ∗ 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒊 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑞

(Model 1)
(Model 2)

The dependent variable, NonGAAP q , is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm

discloses non-GAAP earnings in its earnings release for a given quarter and 0 otherwise. After is
an indicator variable that equals 1 when clawback provisions (or pseudo-assigned clawback
provisions for non-adopters) are in place and 0 otherwise. Claw is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if a firm is a voluntary adopter of clawback provisions and 0 otherwise. In Model 1, the
test sample includes only clawback adopters, and the main variable of interest is After. In Model
2, which employs the difference-in-differences research design, the test sample includes both
clawback adopters and their matched control firms, and the main variable of interest is
After*Claw. Significant coefficients on these variables would provide evidence that clawback
adoption significantly influences the likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure.
I include the following control variables in both models:
Ln(Total Assets)
Intangibles
Tech
Market to Book

= natural log of total assets
= intangible assets divided by total assets
= an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as
defined in Francis and Schipper (1999);
= share price/(common equity/outstanding shares);

33

Lougee and Marquardt (2004) examine the economic determinants of pro forma reporting; Marques (2006) and
Heflin and Hsu (2008) examine the effect of SEC intervention on the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures.
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Sales Growth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
SI
Bigbath
Special Items
Loss
QTR4
Accrual

= quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis
= total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity
= standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous
eight quarters
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm reports a special item in
quarter q and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special
items and negative earnings in the same quarter and 0 otherwise
= a dollar amount of special items divided by total assets
= an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items
for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise
= an indicator variable equal to 1 for the 4th quarter and 0 otherwise
= GAAP earnings less cash from operations divided by total assets

I include Ln(Total Assets) because large firms tend to disclose non-GAAP earnings more
frequently, suggesting firm size is an important factor to control for systematic difference
between clawback adopters and non-adopters. Firms with high intangibles or high-tech firms
have less informative GAAP earnings, and therefore are more likely to release non-GAAP
earnings than other firms (Lougee and Marquardt 2004). As such, I include the amount of
intangible assets (Intangibles) and a high-tech indicator variable (Tech). Since growth firms are
more likely to report non-GAAP earnings, market-to-book ratio (Market to Book) and sales
growth rate (Sales Growth) are included in the model (Lougee and Marquardt 2004).
Leverage is included to control for the increased likelihood of earnings management with
high leverage ratio, which may result in less informative GAAP earnings. Earnings Volatility is
used as a control because investors tend to demand additional information when earnings are
volatile (Defond and Hung 2003). Firms reporting large special items are more likely to disclose
non-GAAP earnings. Following Heflin and Hsu (2008), I include two controls for special items:
(1) SI, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses special items in quarter q
and 0 otherwise; and (2) Special Items, which is the reported dollar amount of special items
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divided by total assets. 34 Since firms that miss earnings benchmarks are more likely to disclose
non-GAAP earnings, I include a loss indicator variable (Loss) that equals one when GAAP
earnings before extraordinary items are negative and zero otherwise. In addition, a “big bath”
indicator variable (Bigbath) is included because firms may be more likely to report non-GAAP
earnings when it reports a one-time charge that results in an operating loss. Heflin and Hsu
(2008) find that firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth quarter than
in other quarters. I therefore include QTR4, an indicator variable equal to 1 for all firm-quarter
observations that represent the firm’s fourth fiscal quarter, and 0 otherwise. Finally, I follow
Doyle et al. (2008) and include total accruals (Accrual) as a control variable. In addition, I
control for time trends in non-GAAP reporting by including year fixed effects, and standard
errors are clustered at the firm level.
The results from estimating Models 1 and 2 are presented in Table 3. When I limit the
sample to only clawback adopters, as in Model 1, I find that the likelihood of non-GAAP
earnings disclosure is marginally significantly higher after clawback adoption – the estimated
coefficient on After is 0.245 (p=0.10). These results indicate that managers are marginally
significantly more likely to release non-GAAP earnings after voluntarily adopting clawback
provisions than before. 35 However, the results are much stronger when I employ the differencein-differences method, as in Model 2. Here, the estimated coefficient on After*Claw is 0.505 and
highly significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that managers are more likely to report non-GAAP
earnings after voluntarily adopting clawback provisions, relative to non-adopters. I therefore

34

In addition to these measures, Heflin and Hsu (2008) include the magnitude of industry mean special items
because it explains significant portion of probability of disclosing non-GAAP earnings. The results are insensitive to
the inclusion of this variable.
35
The marginal effect of voluntary clawback adoption in Model 1 is 0.096; i.e., the probability of releasing nonGAAP earnings is 9.6% higher after voluntarily adopting clawback adoptions than it was prior to clawback adoption.
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reject the null hypothesis H1 and conclude that voluntary clawback adoption significantly
increases the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure.
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with my
expectations. I find the expected positive association between Intangibles or Tech and the
likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure, suggesting that firms with less informative earnings are
significantly more likely to report non-GAAP earnings to communicate their performance, and
Leverage is significantly negatively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure.
Earnings Volatility is positively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure in
Model 1 and 2 (2.097 and 5.002, respectively), consistent with the view that higher GAAP
earnings volatility creates investor demand for additional information to understand fundamental
performance. As expected, when firms disclose special items (SI) they are more likely to disclose
non-GAAP earnings. Special Items is also significantly negatively associated with the probability
of non-GAAP disclosure, indicating that managers are more likely to disclose non-GAAP
earnings as the magnitude of income-decreasing special items becomes larger.
In sum, my analysis of non-GAAP disclosure frequency reveals that firms utilize nonGAAP earnings more frequently after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. The
increases in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures may be either due to the perceived
reduction in GAAP reporting discretion following voluntary clawback adoptions or due to an
improvement in GAAP financial reporting quality, depending on whether the underlying
managerial motives are to inform or mislead investors. Therefore, I further test the quality of
non-GAAP earnings exclusions after voluntary clawback adoption.
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5.2 The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Voluntary Clawback Adoption
To test H2, I follow prior research and define higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as
being more transitory and having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al.
2003; Kolev et al. 2008). As in my tests of H1, I use both the sample of only clawback adopters
and the sample of matched treatment-control pairs to test H2. I employ the following regression
models:

𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑞+1,𝑞+4
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞
+ 𝛼3 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒊,𝒒 ∗ 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒒
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑞
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑞+1,𝑞+4
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞
+ 𝛼4 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞
+ 𝛼6 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖
+ 𝜶𝟖 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒊,𝒒 ∗ 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒊 ∗ 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒒 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑞

(Model 3)

(Model 4)

Control variables included in the models are as follows:

= quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis
= price/(common equity/outstanding shares)
= a natural log of total assets in millions and corresponds to quarter q
= standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous
eight quarters
Loss = an indicator variable equal to 1 if quarterly earnings before
extraordinary items is less than 0 and 0 otherwise
Ln(Age) = natural log of the number of years since a company first appeared in
Compustat

Sales Growth
Market to book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility

Accrual = GAAP earnings less cash flow from operations divided by total
assets
Following Kolev et al. (2008), I use future operating income (FutureOperatingIncome),
defined as earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with
quarter q+1, as the dependent variable for the test of exclusion quality. One advantage of using
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future EPS from operations as a dependent variable is that Compustat excludes nonrecurring
special items but includes recurring items which may be classified as other exclusions from nonGAAP earnings (Kolev et al. 2008).
As noted earlier, non-GAAP earnings (NonGAAPEarnings) are hand-collected from press
releases

in

the

8-K

filings

furnished

by

the

SEC,

and

non-GAAP

exclusions

(NonGAAPExclusions) are defined as non-GAAP earnings less comparable GAAP earnings
disclosed with non-GAAP earnings in the press releases. Claw and After are as defined in
Section 5.1. After*NonGAAPExclusion is the main variable of interest in Model 3, and
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion is the main variable of interest in Model 4. Because prior
research has shown that higher non-GAAP exclusions are associated with lower future
performance (Doyle et al. 2003, Kolev et al. 2008), positively (negatively) significant
coefficients on the variables of interest would indicate that the quality of exclusions has
improved (deteriorated) after clawback adoption.
To control for potential confounding factors affecting future operating income and nonGAAP earnings, I include following control variables. Doyle et al. (2003) argue that growing
firms tend to have lower future operating cash flows because of long-term investment and
increase in the working capital and finds negative association between sales growth rate and
future performance. In addition, prior empirical works find that market to book ratio is positively
correlated to future earnings and non-GAAP reporting decisions. Therefore, I include two
proxies for sales growth: (1) sales growth rate (Sales Growth) and (2) Market-to-book ratio
(Market to book). Firm size (Ln(Total Assets)) is included because the costs of opportunistic nonGAAP reporting may increase with firm size. Firms with less persistent earnings could be
perceived as lower quality of earnings, creating a demand for additional information (Lougee and
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Marquardt 2004). Therefore, I include Earnings Volatility and Loss to control for this effect. I
include Ln(Age) to consider potential effects of firm age on non-GAAP exclusions and future
earnings. Finally, total accruals (Accrual) are included in the model to control for any effects of
accrual reversal on future earnings, which may affect the association between non-GAAP
exclusions and future earnings.
Table 4 presents the results of the exclusion quality tests. The coefficient on
NonGAAPEarning is 1.654 in Model 3, indicating that reported non-GAAP earnings are not
perfectly permanent earnings. 36 Consistent with Doyle et al. (2003) and Kolev et al (2008), the
coefficients on NonGAAPExclusion in Models 3 and 4, are significantly negatively (-0.216, and 0.244, respectively), suggesting that the excluded items are not transitory but likely to recur
within the next four quarters.
If voluntary clawback adoption encourages altruistically motivated managers to disclose
non-GAAP earnings more frequently, the exclusions should be more transitory, suggesting that
the relation between the exclusions and future operating income is less negative after clawback
adoptions. On the other hand, if voluntary clawback adoption motivates opportunistically
motivated managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, non-GAAP exclusions
should be less transitory, suggesting that the relation is more negative after clawback adoption.
In Model 3, the coefficient on After*NonGAAPExclusion is significantly negative (0.410), indicating that exclusions become less transitory after voluntary clawback adoption than
before it. This suggests that managers use non-GAAP earnings more opportunistically after
clawback provisions are in place, consistent with the view that clawback provisions impose
significant costs on managing GAAP earnings and that managers switch their focus toward nonSince future earnings are summed over four quarter starting from q+1, the coefficient of 𝛼1 would be 4 if nonGAAP earnings are perfectly permanent.

36
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GAAP earnings as an earnings management tool after the adoption. Model 4 presents results
using the propensity-score matched sample. The coefficient on the main variable of interest, 𝛼8 ,

is significantly negative (-0.485), again suggesting that the exclusion becomes less transitory, i.e.,
clawback adopters opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings.
The signs of coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with prior literature.
SalesGrowth, firm size (Ln(Total Assets), and firm age are all significantly positively related to
future operating income, which suggests that large, mature firms with good growth opportunities
tend to have better future performance. Earnings Volatility is negatively related to future
operating income, suggesting that firms with less persistent earnings tend to report lower future
earnings. Finally, total accruals (Accrual) are associated with lower future operating income,
consistent with the reversal of accruals.
Taking the results from the frequency (H1) and quality (H2) tests together, the evidence
indicates that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure increases and the quality of non-GAAP
exclusions deteriorates after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. This is consistent
with Case (2) of Figure 1 – i.e., an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting following
voluntary clawback adoption -- and is not an intended consequence of clawback adoption. While
prior research has shown that financial reporting benefits follow clawback adoption (deHaan et
al. 2012; Chan et al. 2012), to my knowledge this is the first evidence to document that any costs
are significantly associated with clawback adoption.
Given the potential importance of these findings, I perform additional analyses in the next
two subsections to confirm that voluntary clawback adoption leads to an increase in
opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP earnings.
5.3 The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Net Operating Assets
79

To confirm my interpretation of increased opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP earnings
following clawback adoption, I build on the work of Barton and Simko (2002), who argue that
high levels of NOA partly reflect the extent of previous earnings management and constrain
managers’ ability to further optimistically bias reported earnings. Consistent with this argument,
Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst
forecasts when NOA is high. If voluntary clawback adoption results in an increase in the
opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure, I expect the decrease in the quality of non-GAAP
exclusions following clawback adoption to be more (less) pronounced for clawback adopters
with high (low) NOA.
To test this supposition, I dichotomize the sample of clawback adopters by the median
level of beginning net operating assets (NOA) on their balance sheet and repeat the analysis from
Table 4. As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficient on the main variable of interest,
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion, is significantly negative only for the High NOA column. The
estimated coefficient is -0.636 and significant at the 0.05 level for the High NOA subsample,
while the estimated coefficient of -0.154 for the Low NOA subsample is not significantly
different from zero. In other words, managers tend to exclude more recurring items from nonGAAP earnings when their ability to manage GAAP earnings is constrained by both a clawback
provision and high levels of NOA, consistent with opportunistic reporting choices.
5.4 The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Meeting or Beating Analyst Forecasts
To further confirm that opportunistic non-GAAP reporting increases after voluntary
clawback adoption, I build on Doyle et al. (2013), who find that managers opportunistically
define non-GAAP earnings in order to meet or beat analyst expectations. If clawback adoption
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leads to an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, I expect the decrease in the quality of
non-GAAP exclusions following clawback adoption to be more (less) pronounced for clawback
adopters that miss (meet or beat) analyst consensus forecasts.
To test for this effect, I dichotomize the sample of clawback adopters into cases where
quarterly GAAP earnings missed the most recent analyst consensus forecast and cases where
quarterly GAAP earnings would meet or beat the forecast and repeat the analysis from Table 4.
As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficient of -0.409 on the main variable of interest,
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion, is marginally significantly negative for the subsample where
GAAP earnings missed analyst forecasts. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of -0.838 is not
significantly different from zero. This suggests that clawback adopters exclude more recurring
items from non-GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings miss the consensus forecast, which is
consistent with opportunistic reporting.
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6. Sensitivity Tests
6.1 The Effect of Types of Clawback Provisions on Non-GAAP Earnings
I conduct an additional test examining the effect of different types of clawback provisions
on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP exclusions. There are three conditions which trigger
clawback provisions: (1) fraudulent activities or misconducts resulting in accounting
restatements (fraud-based provision), (2) inaccurate numbers or errors upon which calculations
of incentive compensation were based and consequently are subject to an accounting restatement
(performance-based provision), and (3) activities which are detrimental to the firms during a
certain period of time after the termination of employment, or through some other violation of a
non-compete agreement (non-compete provision). Since a perceived reporting discretion is not
associated with non-compete clawback provisions, firms adopting non-compete clawback
provisions do not affect firms’ GAAP reporting discretion. However, fraud-based and
performance-based clawback provisions subsequently resulting in accounting restatements
require a firm to claw back incentive compensation which was paid to executives, suggesting
that fraud- and performance-based clawback provisions are likely to reduce the perceived GAAP
reporting discretion. Therefore, I expect that the frequency and quality of non-GAAP disclosure
is related to clawback adoption only when the restatement is required to claw back executive
compensations.
I therefore separate the sample into two groups: clawback adopters with fraud-based or
performance-based clawback provisions and clawback adopters with only non-compete
provisions. In untabulated analysis, I find a significantly increase in the frequency of non-GAAP
disclosure only in the sample consisting of firms adopting fraud- or performance-based clawback
provisions, and an insignificant coefficient in a sample consisting of firms with non-compete
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clawback provisions. I find similar results in the exclusion quality tests. That is, I find a
significant decrease in exclusion quality only in the sample consisting of firms adopting fraud- or
performance-based clawback provisions, and I find no evidence of a relationship between
voluntary clawback adoption and the quality of non-GAAP exclusions in a sample consisting of
firms with non-compete clawback provisions. These results corroborate the conclusion that a
perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion increases managerial focus on non-GAAP
earnings in response to the increased cost of managing GAAP earnings after the voluntary
adoption of clawback provisions.
6.2 The Assumption of the Quarter When Adoption of Clawback Provision Occurs
In testing H1 and H2, I assume that clawback adoption occurs in the first quarter of the
adoption year because the exact date upon which each firm adopts clawback provision is not
disclosed. It can, therefore, be argued that the quarter in which the clawback adoption occurs
systematically varies across firms. One possible solution for this problem is to identify the exact
date of clawback adoption from the proxy statements; however, this would require handcollecting the annual shareholder meeting dates from proxy statements. I attempt to address this
issue by assuming that the adoption decision randomly occurs throughout the year for a given
company. Then I perform the same tests using these randomly assigned quarters as the quarter in
which adoption occurs, rather than assuming that clawback provisions are adopted from the first
quarter of the year for all firms. The untabulated results from this analysis are qualitatively
similar to my main results. 37

37

In addition, I conduct same tests with a sample excluding the clawback adoption years. Untabulated results are
qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper.
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7. Conclusions
The primary objective of compensation recovery provisions, or clawbacks, is to prevent
managers from issuing misstated financial numbers in anticipation of higher compensation.
Under Section 304 of SOX, the SEC is authorized to recover bonus and incentive-based
compensation received by CEOs and CFOs of companies if the companies restate financial
statements due to misconduct, and Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act also includes provisions
on the recovery of compensation given to executive officers based on erroneously reported
information in a prior period. Voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has also gained in
popularity among public companies.
Consistent with the objective of clawback provisions, the extant literature documents that
voluntary adoption of clawback provisions improves financial reporting quality. Investors find
earnings more informative after clawback adoption. This practice may, however, make GAAP
earnings more costly for managers to misstate. I argue that an increase in the costs of misstating
GAAP earnings is likely to change a manager’s non-GAAP reporting behavior because of the
relatively lower costs for misstating non-GAAP earnings after clawback adoption.
I find that managers release non-GAAP earnings more frequently after the voluntary
adoption of clawback provisions. In addition, the quality of non-GAAP exclusions deteriorates
after these provisions are adopted. These findings are consistent with an increase in opportunistic
non-GAAP reporting after clawback adoption, suggesting that an increase in the cost of
manipulating GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings can cause opportunisticallymotivated managers to shift their focus from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings. Additional crosssectional tests on the quality of non-GAAP exclusions corroborate my findings.
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This paper contributes to current literature on voluntary clawback adoption by
documenting that the improvement in financial reporting quality prescribed by GAAP is
achieved at the expense of opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings. It also contributes to the
literature on non-GAAP earnings by documenting that non-GAAP earnings are a substitute for
GAAP earnings in the opportunistic use of earnings metrics when firms are faced with stricter
monitoring environments.
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TABLE 1
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Firms by Voluntary Clawback Adoption Status
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Non-Adopters
2,065
2,123
2,124
2,070
1,980

Adopters
10
36
117
186
256

Total # of firms
2,075
2,159
2,241
2,256
2,238

Panel B: Mean and median differences between voluntary clawback adopters and nonadopters

Total Assets
Sales Growth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Market-to-Book
Special Items
Ln(Age)
Accrual
Tech
Restatement
Big4
%Outside

%Insider
Non-GAAP
NonGAAPEarnings
NonGAAPExclusion
FutureIncome

Clawback
Adopters
12,318
0.350
1.655
0.015
0.138
2.957
-0.003
3.307
-0.047
0.248
0.144
0.871
0.852
0.069
0.688
0.510
0.070
2.023

Means
NonAdopters
2,380
0.300
1.269
0.030
0.300
3.174
-0.004
2.722
-0.033
0.321
0.135
0.678
0.811
0.169
0.539
0.244
0.059
0.928

t-test
-66.02
-1.83
-7.569
20.72
24.57
3.42
-2.24
-64.30
10.46
10.30
-1.74
-29.38
-29.38
33.04
-20.36
-37.28
-2.11
-37.32

***
*
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
**
***

Clawback
Adopters
3,702
0.319
1.211
0.007
0.000
2.479
0.000
3.367
-0.039
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.875
0.029
1.000
0.430
0.000
1.745

Medians
NonAdopters
528
0.163
0.766
0.012
0.000
2.269
0.000
2.708
-0.031
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.833
0.078
1.000
0.190
0.000
0.710

Z-test
-71.07
-7.92
-31.09
30.40
24.40
-6.00
9.98
-61.47
9.30
10.75
-1.74
-28.59
-34.79
48.99
-20.26
-41.13
-4.18
-43.82

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

N
5,208
38,466
5,208
38, 466
Total Assets: total assets in quarter q; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: Total liabilities
divided by book value of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; Loss: an indicator variable
equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common
equity/outstanding shares); Special Items: special items reported in Compustat divided by total assets; Ln(Age): Log of the number of years since
the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm
i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); Restatement: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm restates its
financial statements within the prior two years; Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis
and Schipper (1999); Big4: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company hires a big4 auditor; %Outside: the percentage of outside
directors on board; %Insider: the percentage of insiders’ shareholding; Non-GAAP equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP in the quarter and
0 if not; Non-GAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings;
FutureIncome: Earnings per Share from operations, summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1. Test of differences in means and
median are based on two-tailed tests. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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TABLE 2
Propensity-Score Matching
Panel A: Logit Estimation Results
𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘𝑞+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7 𝑆𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼9 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑞 + 𝛼12 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼13 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞
+ 𝛼14 𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑞 + 𝛼15 %𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼16 %𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼17 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑞 + 𝛼18 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞
+ 𝛼19 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞
Dependent Variable: Claw

2005

Coef
Intercept
Ln(Total Assets)
Sales Growth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Market-to-Book
SI
Special Items
Ln(Age)
Accrual
Restatement
Restate_error
Tech
Big4
%Outside
%Insider
NonGAAP
NonGAAPEarnings
NonGAAPExclusion
Industry Fixed effect

2006

t-stat

-3.018
-0.018
-0.036
0.979
-21.71
2.716 **
-0.074
0.372
-1.339
1.310
-9.531
-1.297
0.830
18.021 ***
0.630
-4.258
-6.395
2.614 *
-0.633
-1.203
Yes

-0.63
-0.05
-0.22
0.32
-0.61
2.00
-0.46
0.01
-1.25
1.42
-1.20
-0.76
0.61
8.12
0.62
-0.99
-0.81
1.69
-0.54
-0.80

Coef

2007

t-stat

-13.35 ***
0.716 ***
0.132
-1.517
-22.55
2.024 **
0.017
-24.93
-0.054
0.931
-9.058 *
1.783
-0.950
-1.763
2.476 **
1.012
1.073
0.974
-0.274
-1.602 **

-3.57
3.44
1.06
-0.92
-0.91
2.13
0.27
-1.51
-0.09
1.61
-1.83
1.52
-0.83
-1.35
1.99
0.32
0.71
1.35
-0.45
-2.25

Yes

Coef

2008

t-stat

-10.11 ***
0.550 ***
-0.037
-0.051
-7.820
-0.676
0.011
12.75
-0.411
1.111 ***
-6.245 ***
-0.098
0.461
-0.221
1.104 ***
1.535
-1.636 *
-0.075
-0.522
0.042
Yes

-4.91
5.20
-0.51
-0.07
-0.81
-1.17
0.30
0.90
-1.34
4.13
-2.87
-0.19
1.16
-0.29
2.75
0.93
-1.67
-0.26
-1.55
0.09

Coef

2009

t-stat

-10.29 ***
0.839 ***
-0.128
0.085
-7.972
-0.802
-0.015
29.18 **
-0.909 ***
0.920 ***
-5.614 **
-0.472
1.150 ***
-1.020
0.080
-0.361
-3.521 **
0.649 *
-0.342
0.682
Yes

-4.36
6.44
-1.63
0.12
-0.77
-1.28
-0.38
2.11
-2.81
3.15
-2.36
-0.71
2.64
-1.51
0.20
-0.21
-2.33
1.85
-0.92
1.61

Coef

t-stat

-15.13 ***
0.685 ***
0.038
-0.312
-24.20 **
0.136
-0.005
-2.506
-0.481
1.266 ***
-1.847
0.539
0.043
0.176
0.125
2.610
-2.806 **
0.393
-0.302
-0.487 *

-5.11
6.26
0.68
-0.46
-2.25
0.33
-0.11
-0.40
-1.29
4.79
-0.91
0.93
0.08
0.28
0.34
1.47
-2.45
1.25
-1.11
-1.71

Yes

N
302
729
1,652
1,688
1,728
Adjusted R2
0.324
0.309
0.278
0.332
0.391
𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; Ln(Total Assets): natural log of
total assets; SalesGrowth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: total liabilities divided by book value
of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if
earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is negative and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding
shares); SI: an indicator variable that equals one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special Items: the
amount of reported special items divided by total assets; Leverage: Total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity;
Ln(Age): natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accrual: GAAP earnings less cash from
operations divided by total assets; Restatement: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm restates its financial statement within prior
two years and 0 otherwise; Restate_error: an indicator variable that accounting restatement is due to clerical errors, and 0 otherwise;
Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999), and 0 otherwise;
Big4: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company hires a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise; %Outside: the percentage of outside
directors on board; %Insider: the percentage of insiders’ shareholding; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings
per share; Non-GAAP equals 1 if a NonGAAPEarnings does not equal GAAPEarnings and zero otherwise. NonGAAPExclusions:
Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings. All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1
percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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Panel B: Propensity Score Matching Results
Mean Difference (Matched Quarter)

Total Assets
Sales Growth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
SI
Special Items
Loss
Market-to-Book
Ln(Age)
Accrual
Tech
Restatement
Big4 Auditor
%Outside
Insiderholding
NonGAAP
FutureIncome
NonGAAPEarnings
NonGAAPExclusion
N

Clawback
Adopters
12916
0.330
2.354
8.316
0.713
-0.007
0.202
2.930
3.219
-0.099
0.231
0.166
0.874
0.841
0.078
0.765
1.734
0.461
0.154

NonAdopters
12969
0.342
2.612
8.285
0.660
-0.007
0.235
3.161
3.189
-0.097
0.255
0.142
0.895
0.844
0.078
0.741
1.585
0.445
0.125

247

247

t-test
0.02
0.06
0.66
-0.70
-1.26
0.15
0.87
0.72
-0.64
0.39
0.63
-0.75
0.70
0.36
0.03
-0.63
-0.63
-0.32
-0.53

Median Difference (Matched Quarter)
Wilcox
Clawback
NonRank
Adopters
Adopters
Sum test
3594
3987
0.01
0.301
0.202
-0.52
1.405
1.286
-1.03
0.006
0.006
-0.35
1
1
-1.26
0.000
0
0.66
0
0
0.87
2.205
2.150
-1.19
3.258
3.258
-0.98
-0.090
-0.092
-0.08
0
0
0.63
0
0
-0.75
1
1
0.70
0.875
0.875
0.27
0.036
0.034
-0.04
1
1
-0.63
1.620
1.595
-0.45
0.450
0.440
-0.41
0.010
0
-1.27
247

247

Panel C: Difference in Matched Propensity Scores
N

Mean

1%

25%

50%

75%

99%

Std. Dev.

247

-0.002

-0.029

-0.001

0.000

0.000

0.007

0.005
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Panel D: Hand-Collected Sample Composition (using press release data)
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

Non-Adopters
16
58
60
54
188

Clawback Adopters
16
58
60
54
188

Panel E: Difference between Clawback Adopters and Non-Clawback Adopters
(using press release data)

NonGAAP
NonGAAPEarnings
NonGAAPExclusion
Fopi
Total Assets
Sales Growth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Market-to-Book
Special Items
Ln(Age)
Accrual
Tech
Restatement
Big4
%Outside

%Insider
N

Mean Difference (Matched Quarter)
Mean
Clawback
NonDiff tAdopter
Adopters
test
0.369
0.390
0.60
0.557
0.498
-1.20
0.029
0.035
0.26
2.044
2.092
0.32
10,187
10,837
-0.36
0.562
0.407
-1.01
1.604
1.798
0.86
0.012
0.013
0.74
0.095
0.116
0.89
2.970
3.097
0.61
0.520
0.552
0.88
4.020
4.019
-0.14
-0.023
-0.028
-1.43
0.228
0.226
-0.07
0.130
0.118
-0.47
0.971
0.950
-1.43
0.839
0.837
-0.30
0.087
0.072
1.51
188

188

Median Difference (Matched Quarter)
Median
Clawback
NonDiff ZAdopter
Adopters
test
0
0
0.60
0.44
0.43
-1.18
0
0
1.38
1.800
1.860
0.851
3,102
2,774
-1.66
0.443
0.371
-0.38
1.218
1.190
-1.18
0.007
0.008
1.19
0
0
0.89
2.417
2.302
-0.63
1
1
0.88
4.025
4.025
-0.08
-0.026
-0.027
-0.91
0
0
-0.07
0
0
-0.47
1
1
-1.43
0.875
0.867
-0.76
0.033
0.037
1.69
188
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188

*

*

TABLE 3
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2005 Q1–2009 Q4).
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑞 � = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜶𝟑 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 ∗ 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘 + 𝛼4 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞
+ 𝛼7 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝑆𝐼𝑞
+ 𝛼12 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑞 + 𝛼13 𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼14 𝑄𝑇𝑅4 + 𝛼15 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞

(2)

NonGAAP equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP in the quarter and 0 if not; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is voluntary
clawback adopters and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the period q is after the clawback adoption among clawback
adopters and 0 otherwise; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets; Intangibles: Intangible assets divided by total assets; Tech: an
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); Market-to-book: price/(common
equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: Total liabilities divided by
book value of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; SI: an indicator variable that equals
one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special Items: the amount of reported special items; Bigbath: one if if a firm
reports a negative special items and negative earnings in the same quarter; QTR4: an indicator variable for each quarter; Accruals: GAAP
earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99
percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Model 1
Only Clawback
Adopters
Coef
Intercept
Claw
After
After*Claw
Ln(Total Assets)
Intangibles
Tech
Market-to-Book
SalesGrowth
Leverage
Earnings Volatility
SI
Bigbath
Special Items
QTR4
Accrual
Year Fixed

𝛼0

𝜶𝟏
𝛼2

-1.606
0.245

t-stat
***

-3.54

*

1.78

0.061

1.29

𝛼3

1.618

***

4.54

0.708

***

4.92

0.000

0.01

𝛼6

-0.008

-0.49

𝛼4
𝛼5
𝛼7
𝛼8
𝛼9

𝛼11
𝛼10
𝛼12
𝛼13

-0.721

**

-2.08

11.624

***

3.96

0.992

***

10.04

0.124
-0.002

Model 2
Propensity-Score
Matched Sample

0.85
***

-2.59

0.055

0.70

-1.212

-1.37

Coef
𝛼0
𝛼1

𝛼2

𝜶𝟑
𝛼4

t-stat

-1.220

***

-3.88

-0.218

*

-1.87

-0.338

***

-2.84

0.505

***

4.24

0.056

1.55

𝛼5

1.163

***

4.29

0.701

***

5.87

0.034

**

𝛼8

-0.003

𝛼6
𝛼7
𝛼9

𝛼10
𝛼11
𝛼13
𝛼12
𝛼14
𝛼15

-0.564

**

-2.21

7.168

***

3.16

1.091

***

14.32

***

-3.72

0.121
-0.002

1.23

0.017

0.33

-0.979

-1.62

Yes

Yes

N

3,516

6,931

Pseudo R2

0.225

0.229

90

2.29
-0.24

TABLE 4
The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2009 (2005 Q1–2009 Q4).
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑞+1,𝑞+4
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝜶𝟖 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒒 × 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘
× 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞
+ 𝛼12 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼13 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛼14 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼15 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

(3)

FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operations which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the
period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations; NonGAAPEarnings: Non-GAAP earnings per share, as disclosed in firms’ quarterly earnings release; NonGAAPExclusions:
NonGAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): a natural
log of total assets in quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss:
an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book:
price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat;
Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized
at 1 percent and 99 percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Model 3
Only
Clawback Adopters
Coef
𝛼0

Intercept
Claw

𝛼2

After
NonGAAPExclusions
Claw*NonGAAPExclusion
After*NonGAAPExclusion

α3

𝜶𝟒

(𝜶𝟑 + 𝜶𝟔 )

After*Claw

t-stat

-2.827 *

𝛼1

NonGAAPEarnings

1.654 ***

-1.83
11.01

0.018

0.19

-0.216 *

-1.90

-0.410 **

-2.26

-0.627 ***

-3.97

Market to Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Firm Age)
Accrual

(𝜶𝟒 + 𝜶𝟓 + 𝜶𝟔 + 𝜶𝟖 )
𝛼5

0.097 ***

3.18

0.040

1.61

0.298 ***

6.54

𝛼8

-8.343 ***

-4.35

𝛼6
𝛼7
𝛼9

𝛼10
𝛼11

Coef
𝛼0
𝛼1

𝛼2
𝛼3
𝛼4

0.239

1.46

0.401

1.07

-3.444 ***

Year Fixed

-4.05

t-stat

-3.557 ***

-2.74

1.648 ***

16.67

-0.030

-0.29

0.012

0.11

-0.244 ***
0.100

0.87

0.055

0.44

𝛼7

-0.006

-0.05

-0.485 **

-2.08

-0.574 ***

-3.31

𝛼9

0.023 **

0.00

0.012

0.74

0.246 ***

7.20

𝛼12

-8.175 ***

-4.03

-0.115

-0.85

𝛼6

𝛼10
𝛼11
𝛼13
𝛼14
𝛼15

0.719 **

2.29

-4.588 ***

-5.67

Yes

Yes

N

3,455

6,781

R2

0.548

0.532

91

-3.32

𝛼5

𝜶𝟖

After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion
Sales Growth

Model 4
Propensity-Score
Matched Sample

TABLE 5
Net Operating Assets and the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2009 (2005 Q1–2009 Q4).
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑞+1,𝑞+4
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝜶𝟖 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒒 × 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘
× 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞
+ 𝛼12 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼13 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑞 + 𝛼14 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼15 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

(3)

FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the
period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP
Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets in quarter
q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Negative Surprise: an indicator
variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common
equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP
earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99
percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
High NOA
Coef
Intercept
NonGAAPEarnings
Claw
After
NonGAAPExclusions
Claw*NonGAAPExclusion
After*NonGAAPExclusion
After*Claw
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion
Sales Growth
Market to Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Firm Age)
Accrual

𝛼0
𝛼1

𝛼2

𝜶𝟑
𝛼4
𝛼5
𝛼6
𝛼7

𝜶𝟖
𝛼9

𝛼10
𝛼11
𝛼12
𝛼13
𝛼14
𝛼15

Year Fixed

Low NOA
t-stat

-4.846 ***

-3.70

1.658 ***

13.48

Coef

t-stat

-1.983

-1.16

1.726 ***

-0.046

-0.39

-0.020

-0.16

-0.003

-0.02

0.026

0.21

-0.344 ***

-2.64

-0.263 ***

-3.00

0.142

0.90

0.098

0.122

0.83

0.040

0.48
0.21

-0.046

-0.29

-0.004

-0.03

-0.636 **

-2.57

-0.154

-0.56

0.084 ***

3.56

0.089 ***

2.59

0.007

0.33

0.017

0.98

0.267 ***

7.18

0.216 ***

5.77

-9.095 ***

-2.64

-8.066 ***

-4.26

-0.253

-1.53

0.106

0.968 ***

2.98

0.395

-5.893 ***

-6.37

0.65
0.95

-2.517 ***

Yes

Yes

N

3,817

2,964

R2

0.550

0.524

92

11.45

-2.86

TABLE 6
The Meeting/Beating Analysts Forecast on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2009 (2005 Q1–2009 Q4).
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑞+1,𝑞+4
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 + 𝛼4 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼5 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼6 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝜶𝟖 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒒 × 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘
× 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼10 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼11 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞
+ 𝛼12 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼13 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑞 + 𝛼14 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼15 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4

(3)

FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the
period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP
Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets in quarter
q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Negative Surprise: an indicator
variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common
equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP
earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99
percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Missing Analysts’
Consensus
Coef
Intercept
NonGAAPEarnings
Claw
After
NonGAAPExclusions
Claw*NonGAAPExclusion
After*NonGAAPExclusion
After*Claw
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion
Sales Growth
Market to Book
Ln(Total Assets)
Earnings Volatility
Loss
Ln(Firm Age)
Accrual

𝛼0

t-stat

-4.706 **

𝛼1

1.374 ***

𝛼2

𝜶𝟑
𝛼4
𝛼6
𝛼7

𝜶𝟖
𝛼9

𝛼10
𝛼11
𝛼12
𝛼13
𝛼14
𝛼15

Year Fixed

11.79

Coef

t-stat

-2.931 **
1.951 ***

-0.30

-0.058

-0.51

0.020

0.14

-0.010

-0.07

-0.857 ***

-2.93

-2.26

0.134

1.17

0.096

0.27

-0.037

-0.23

0.549

1.06

-0.060

-0.41

0.067

0.52

-0.409 *

-1.80

-0.838

-1.40

0.102 ***

3.18

0.062 **

2.37

0.012

0.58

0.023

1.52

0.251 ***

6.03

0.219 ***

5.94

-7.412 ***

-3.31

-7.913 ***

-3.02

-0.243 *

-1.90

-0.522 **

-2.13

0.924 **

1.96

-6.237 ***

-6.06

0.422

1.40

-2.821 ***

Yes

Yes

N

2,913

3,732

R2

0.497

0.545

93

-2.30
12.47

-0.040
-0.193 **

𝛼5

-2.53

Meeting/Beating
Analysts’ Consensus

-3.26

Figure 1
Interpretation of Hypothesis Test Results

H2: QUALITY of non-GAAP disclosure

Increase (+)
H1:
FREQUENCY
of
non-GAAP
disclosure
Decrease (-)

Increase (+)

Decrease (-)

Increase in
ALTRUISTIC
non-GAAP reporting
(Case 1)

Increase in
OPPORTUNISTIC
non-GAAP reporting
(Case 2)

Decrease in
OPPORTUNISTIC
non-GAAP reporting
(Case 3)

Decrease in
ALTRUISTIC
non-GAAP reporting
(Case 4)
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